Matter of 1215 N. Blvd., LLC v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town ofN. Hempstead
2009 NY Slip Op 05346 [63 AD3d 1071]
June 23, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2009


In the Matter of 1215 Northern Boulevard, LLC,Appellant,
v
Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of North Hempstead,Respondent.

[*1]Sahn Ward & Baker, PLLC, Uniondale, N.Y. (Michael H. Sahn and Jason Horowitz ofcounsel), for appellant.

Richard S. Finkel, Town Attorney, Manhasset, N.Y. (Simone M. Freeman of counsel), forrespondent.

In a proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of theBoard of Zoning Appeals of the Town of North Hempstead dated June 6, 2007, which, after ahearing, denied the petitioner's application for conditional use permits and area variances, thepetitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Iannacci, J.), enteredSeptember 29, 2008, which, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioner applied for a permit to demolish an existing building and use the parcel foroff-street employee parking. The Town of North Hempstead Department of Building Safety,Inspection & Enforcement denied the application and informed the petitioner that the intendeduse required conditional use permits and area variances. The petitioner submitted an applicationfor the conditional use permits and area variances to the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Townof North Hempstead (hereinafter the BZA). The application ultimately was denied because theBZA interpreted the Code of the Town of North Hempstead (hereinafter the Town Code) asrequiring a use variance, not conditional use permits, for the petitioner's intended use. In thisensuing proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, the Supreme Court determined that the BZA'sdenial of the application was proper and, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed theproceeding. We affirm.

"Under a zoning ordinance which authorizes interpretation of its requirements by the boardof appeals, specific application of a term of the ordinance to a particular property is. . . governed by the board's interpretation, unless unreasonable or irrational"(Matter of Frishman v Schmidt, 61 NY2d 823, 825 [1984]; see Matter of Kennedy vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Patchogue, 57 AD3d 546 [2008]; Matter of Conti vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Ardsley, 53 AD3d 545, 547 [2008]). Here, the BZA'sdetermination that the petitioner's proposed use of the premises as an employee parking lot for itsnearby business did not constitute "[p]arking space for the parking, storage and sale ofautomobiles" (Town Code § 70-126 [D] [*2][emphasissupplied]) was neither unreasonable nor irrational. There is no merit to the petitioner's argumentthat the use of the word "and" by the drafters of the relevant Town Code provision must properlybe interpreted to mean "or." Spolzino, J.P., Angiolillo, Chambers and Hall, JJ., concur.


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