| Matter of Defayette v Verizon |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05661 [64 AD3d 836] |
| July 2, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Andrew Defayette, Appellant, vVerizon et al., Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
—[*1] Stockton, Barker & Mead, L.L.P., Albany (Leith Carole Ramsey of counsel), for Verizonand another, respondents.
Stein, J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed November 29,2007, which denied claimant's request to reopen his case.
Claimant suffered a work-related injury to his back in January 2003 and was awardedworkers' compensation benefits. In October 2004, although claimant's physician opined that heremained totally disabled, an independent medical examiner concluded that claimant had nodisability and could work without any restrictions. Based on the latter opinion, the self-insuredemployer suspended claimant's workers' compensation benefits. Following two hearings atwhich medical testimony was provided, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge (hereinafterWCLJ) concluded that claimant's complaints of pain were not substantiated by any objectivefindings. On appeal, the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed that determination and closedthe case. Claimant's request for full Board review was denied and his appeal to this Court wasnot perfected. Thereafter, claimant—represented by new counsel—submittedmultiple reports from treating physicians attempting to establish that he remained unable to workas a result of his back injury. After a further hearing, a different WCLJ declined to reopenclaimant's case, [*2]concluding that all relevant issues had beenfully litigated, addressed and resolved. The Board concurred with that assessment and upheld theWCLJ's determination. On this appeal, claimant asserts that the Board failed to consider all ofthe pertinent medical evidence prior to rendering its decision.
We disagree and affirm. "The Board retains jurisdiction to reopen, modify or rescind a priordetermination (see Workers' Compensation Law § 123), and the applicableregulations make provision for reopening where 'certain material evidence not available forpresentation before the [B]oard at the time of hearing is now available' (12 NYCRR 300.14 [a][1]). However, the exercise of that power rests in the Board's discretion and, absent an abusethereof, will not be disturbed on appeal" (Matter of Cagle v Judge Motor Corp., 31 AD3d 1016, 1017-1018[2006], lv dismissed 7 NY3d 922 [2006]). Here, inasmuch as the additional evidenceproferred by claimant was either available at the time of the prior determinations or failed toindicate a material change in his condition, we discern no basis on which to disturb the Board'sdenial of his request to reopen his claim (see Matter of Palma v New York City Dept. ofCorrections, 301 AD2d 774, 775 [2003]). In any event, on both occasions that it consideredthe matter, the Board acknowledged that claimant had submitted medicalevidence—including medical records from treating physicians—indicating a furthercausally related disability. Notwithstanding its consideration of such evidence, the Board electedto credit the opinion of the independent medical examiner who, in addition to stating that therewas no evidence of a disability, testified that claimant was not merely magnifying symptoms, butthat he was complaining of symptoms "that were not objectified at all." Such a resolution ofconflicting medical evidence was entirely within the Board's province (see Matter of Robinson v New VentureGear, 9 AD3d 571, 572 [2004]).
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision isaffirmed, without costs.