| Matter of Village of Saranac Lake |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05722 [64 AD3d 958] |
| July 9, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Acquisition of Real Property by the Village ofSaranac Lake. Village of Saranac Lake, Appellant; Wayne Bujold et al., Respondents, et al.,Respondents. (And Five Other Related Proceedings.) |
—[*1] Flink Smith, L.L.C., Latham (Edward B. Flink of counsel), for Wayne Bujold and another,respondents. Fischer, Bessette, Muldowney & Hunter, L.L.P., Malone (John J. Muldowney of counsel),for John S. Banta and others, respondents. Law Office of Madonna & Cowen, Plattsburgh (Mark V. Cowen of counsel), for Edward J.Dukett, respondent.
Cardona, P.J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Demarest, J.), entered July 25,2008 in Franklin County, which, in six proceedings pursuant to EDPL article 4, among otherthings, partially granted the motion of respondents Wayne Bujold and Denise Bujold seeking theremediation of allegedly defective repairs and awarded counsel fees.[*2]
In August 2005, petitioner commenced the instantproceedings pursuant to EDPL article 4 seeking to exercise its eminent domain power to obtaineasements from, among others, respondents Wayne Bujold and Denise Bujold (hereinaftercollectively referred to as respondents) in order to install, repair or replace sewer lines under theaffected property. Shortly thereafter, petitioner sought, by order to show cause, to gainimmediate access to respondents' property pursuant to EDPL 402 (B) (6) so as to enable it tocomplete what it characterized as emergency repairs on the existing sewer line. In an order datedAugust 22, 2005, Supreme Court granted immediate access to respondents' property, directingthat petitioner deposit the sum of $2,000 with the Franklin County Clerk's office. Petitionerthereafter commenced work on respondents' property, which was completed in early 2006. In themeantime, respondents, as well as other similarly situated property owners, submitted answersand objections to the petitions. In April 2006, Supreme Court ordered a hearing on the issues of,among other things, the scope of the easements sought by petitioner. Prior to completion of thehearing, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations. However, those discussions failed toresolve all disputed matters and it appears the hearing was not concluded.
Thereafter, respondents moved, in June 2008, by order to show cause, for an order directing,among other things, petitioner to return respondents' "property to the condition that it was priorto the replacement of the sewer line," including the repair of allegedly unsafe conditions in thevicinity of the covered manholes that had been installed. Respondents also sought an award ofcounsel fees pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. Supreme Court denied injunctive relief as well asrespondents' other requests, except that the court ordered petitioner to make certain repairsrelated to the manholes and awarded respondents counsel fees in the amount of $5,000.
Initially, in this appeal, petitioner challenges the propriety of Supreme Court's order that itcomplete repair work to the area where the manholes were installed. According to petitioner,inasmuch as, among other things, the instant proceedings are still in the procedural posture ofacquisition, and not at the compensation stage, the court's direction was premature. Significantly,the eminent domain process for the acquisition of real property under the EDPL proceedsthrough a number of steps (seegenerally Matter of 49 WB, LLC v Village of Haverstraw, 44 AD3d 226, 244-245[2007]). A condemnor must initially determine that it will seek to exercise its powers of eminentdomain for the public good (see EDPL 201, 204). Once that is done, the condemnor maybring a proceeding pursuant to EDPL article 4 to formally acquire title to the subject property(see EDPL 401). When the condemnor obtains such title, a claim for compensationripens, which is redressable by the various proceedings authorized under EDPL articles 5 and 6(see EDPL 501, 503, 601). Notably, this compensation includes recovery for the loss ofthe property itself as well as for the diminution of the value of the residual property, if only aportion is taken (see Murphy v State ofNew York, 14 AD3d 127, 132 [2004]; Matter of County of Schenectady [Pahl],194 AD2d 1004, 1008 [1993], lv denied 84 NY2d 806 [1994]; Town of Fallsburgh vSilverman, 260 App Div 532, 532 [1940], affd 286 NY 594 [1941]; see alsoEDPL 701). Furthermore, in cases such as this involving the emergency section of EDPL 402(B) (6), that statute provides that property owners will be compensated for damages to their landeven if, among other things, the petition is ultimately dismissed or no award is made.
Here, it is apparent that the damages asserted by respondents in their motion concerning the"unattractive" state in which petitioner allegedly left their property after completing itsemergency work are all potentially compensable under the EDPL (see Waxman v State ofNew York, 57 AD2d 244, 252 n 7 [1977]). Thus, at this juncture, Supreme Court did notaward [*3]money damages and denied any relief related to theappearance of the property. This was appropriate because, while respondents may ultimatelydemonstrate a diminution in the value of the property, that does not alter the fact that the instantproceeding remains postured under EDPL article 4, which focuses on the proposed vesting oftitle in petitioner (see EDPL 401 et seq.). Once the current EDPL article 4proceedings before Supreme Court conclude either by, among other things, dismissal or byservice of a notice of acquisition or vesting of title, respondents may then assert their claim fordamages related to, among other things, the alleged diminution in value of their property(see EDPL 402 [B] [6]; 502 [B]; 503).
With respect to respondents' allegations claiming that petitioner, after gaining access to theirproperty through the emergency provision of EDPL 402 (B) (6), proceeded to leave the propertyin the vicinity of the manholes in an unsafe and dangerous condition, we reach a differentconclusion. Although petitioner asserts that Supreme Court has no authority to grant any relief atthis stage, we disagree. It would defy common sense for a court to be authorized to permit aproposed condemnor to enter immediately upon the property of a landowner in "the publicinterests" (EDPL 402 [B] [6]), but then maintain that said court has no power to direct furtherremediation in the face of established proof that the condemnor created an unsafe or dangerouscondition on that land. Accordingly, we do not find remediation relief in circumstances such asthis to be outside Supreme Court's authority. Nevertheless, we note that petitioner disputesrespondents' allegations to the effect that it left their property in a hazardous condition.Furthermore, the record does not contain sufficient factual findings by the court explaining itsconclusions in that regard or providing details concerning which, if not all, of the manholes areincluded in that order. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the court for further proceedings.
Finally, petitioner challenges the propriety of the grant of counsel fees to respondents. Whilerespondents maintain that such an award was valid in light of the alleged frivolous conduct,"[s]uch sanctions must be included in a written order which indicates the conduct creating a basisfor sanctions, reasons why the court found this conduct frivolous and a justification for theamount imposed as sanctions" (Matterof Schermerhorn v Quinette, 28 AD3d 822, 823 [2006]; see 22 NYCRR130-1.2). Inasmuch as Supreme Court's order herein does not include the required information,the award of counsel fees must be reversed (see Matter of Schermerhorn v Quinette, 28AD3d at 823). Moreover, although respondents suggest that the fee award could be upheld undera different legal theory, we cannot agree given the information presently before us.
The remaining issues raised herein have been examined and found to be unpersuasive.
Rose, Kane, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law,without costs, by reversing so much thereof as directed petitioner to perform certain repairs andawarded counsel fees; matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings notinconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.