| Matter of DelVecchio v DelVecchio |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05774 [64 AD3d 594] |
| July 7, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Dominic DelVecchio,Appellant, v Jacqueline DelVecchio, Respondent. |
—[*1] Anne R. Mueller, West Harrison, N.Y., for respondent. Robin D. Carton, White Plains, N.Y., attorney for the children.
In a visitation proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, which was transferred tothe Integrated Domestic Violence Part of the Supreme Court (see 22 NYCRR 141.4), thefather appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Walker, J.), enteredMarch 7, 2008, which, without a hearing, dismissed the petition.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as dismissed the branch of the petitionwhich was for visitation with the child Francis Brundage is dismissed as academic, without costsor disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
This visitation proceeding was transferred to the Integrated Domestic Violence Part of theSupreme Court pursuant to the Rules of the Chief Judge(22 NYCRR) part 41, and the Rules ofthe Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) part 141, and is "subject to the samesubstantive and procedural law as would have applied to it had it not been transferred" (22NYCRR 141.5 [b]). Accordingly, the provisions of the Family Court Act are applicable to thedetermination of the petition.
The oldest child has reached the age of 18 years. Since the Family Court only hasjurisdiction to direct visitation with minor children, defined as children who have not attained theage of 18 years (see Family Ct Act § 119 [c]; § 651), the proceeding withrespect to the oldest child has been rendered academic (see Matter of Cruz v Cruz, 48 AD3d 804, 804-805 [2008]; Matter of Lozada v Pinto, 7 AD3d801 [2004]).
We affirm the dismissal of those branches of the petition which were for visitation with theparties' two younger children. On January 29, 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the father's prose petition dated June 14, 2007 for failure to appear at a scheduled hearing, and, noting that hehad filed frequent baseless petitions in a short period of time, it directed that he could not file[*2]any further pro se petitions without court approval (see Matter of Simpson v Ptaszynska,41 AD3d 607 [2007]; Matterof Pignataro v Davis, 8 AD3d 487 [2004]; Sassower v Signorelli, 99 AD2d 358[1984]). Since the father failed to obtain leave of court before filing the instant pro se petition,the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the petition without ahearing (cf. Matter of Plummer vPlummer, 25 AD3d 558 [2006]).
The father's remaining contention is without merit. Spolzino, J.P., Angiolillo, Leventhal andLott, JJ., concur.