| People v Sanchez |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05799 [64 AD3d 618] |
| July 7, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Gustavo Sanchez, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Sholom J. Twersky,and O'Melveny & Myers LLP [Brian P. Finnegan], of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingram, J.),rendered January 12, 2006, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance inthe third degree and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree, upon a juryverdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, ofthat branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the hearing court properly determined that he lackedstanding to challenge the search of the sports utility vehicle in which the police had observedhim place two packages of bundled glassine envelopes. The defendant did not sustain his burdenof showing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, which was registeredto another individual (see Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128 [1978]; People vRamirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99 [1996]). The defendant neither produced the vehicleregistration, nor claimed that he was entitled to use the vehicle (cf. People v Gonzalez,68 NY2d 950, 951 [1986]). The fact that the defendant possessed keys which fit the vehicledid not establish his right to drive or possess the vehicle, that he had a legitimate expectation ofprivacy in it, or that he had standing to dispute the validity of its search (see People v Miller,298 AD2d 467 [2002]; People v Vargas, 140 AD2d 472, 473 [1988]; see alsoUnited States v Sanchez, 635 F2d 47 [1980]). Accordingly, the hearing court properlydenied that branch of the defendant's motion which was to suppress the drugs and drugparaphernalia seized from the vehicle.
Furthermore, the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant (seeCPL 140.10 [1] [b]; People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, 635 [1995]). Therefore, thehearing court also properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was to suppressmoney taken from his person after his valid arrest.
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Rivera, J.P., Dillon, Balkin and Austin, JJ., concur.