| Sanatass v Town of N. Hempstead |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05955 [64 AD3d 695] |
| July 21, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Doreen Sanatass, Respondent, v Town of NorthHempstead, Appellant, and Bea Simpson et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Andrea & Towsky, Garden City, N.Y. (Robert L. Towsky of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Town of NorthHempstead appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court,Nassau County (Murphy, J.), entered November 19, 2008, as denied its motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it and grantedthe plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend her complaint and bill of particulars to add anallegation that it received prior written notice of the alleged sidewalk defect.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant Town of North Hempstead failedto establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether itreceived prior written notice of the alleged defect (see Bonilla v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 49 AD3d 788, 789[2008]; Kramer v Town of Hempstead, 284 AD2d 503, 504 [2001]). Accordingly, theSupreme Court properly denied the Town's motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
"Leave to amend pleadings should be freely given provided that the amendment is notpalpably insufficient, does not prejudice or surprise the opposing party, and is not patentlydevoid of merit" (Gitlin vChirinkin, 60 AD3d 901, 902 [2009]; see Sheila Props., Inc. v A Real Good Plumber, Inc., 59 AD3d 424,426 [2009]; Boakye-Yiadom vRoosevelt Union Free School Dist., 57 AD3d 929, 931 [2008]). "A determinationwhether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court's broad discretion, and the exercise ofthat discretion will not be lightly disturbed" (Gitlin v Chirinkin, 60 AD3d at 902; see Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d806, 808 [2007]). Under the circumstances presented here, the Supreme Court providentlyexercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend her pleadingspursuant to CPLR 3025 (b). Fisher, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Hall, JJ., concur.