| People v Coleman |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 06031 [64 AD3d 787] |
| July 28, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JamalColeman, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Jodi L. Mandel, andJudith Aarons of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sullivan, J.),rendered February 5, 2007, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the thirddegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the trial court's Allen charge (see Allen v UnitedStates, 164 US 492 [1896]) was coercive is unpreserved for appellate review, as thedefendant neither requested a specific charge nor objected to the charge given (see People vGonzales, 281 AD2d 432 [2001]). In any event, the charge was balanced and neutral in tone,and it did not urge any dissenting jurors to abandon their convictions and acquiesce in theopinion of the other jurors, attempt to coerce or compel the jurors to reach a particular verdict, orshame the jurors into reaching a verdict (see People v Aponte, 2 NY3d 304, 308 [2004]; People vGonzales, 281 AD2d at 432; CJI2d[NY] Deadlock Charge).
"Generally, the declaration of a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury is a matter of discretion forthe Trial Judge, who is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is required under thecircumstances of the case, and this decision must be accorded great deference" (People v Sanders, 51 AD3d 825,825 [2008]; see CPL 310.60 [1] [a]). In assessing the trial court's exercise of its broaddiscretion, this Court "should consider: (1) the length and complexity of the trial, (2) the lengthof the jury's deliberations, (3) the extent and nature of communications between the trial courtand the jury, and (4) the potential effects of requiring the jury to engage in further deliberations"(People v Wincelowicz, 258 AD2d 602, 603 [1999]). Here, the jury notified the trialcourt that it was deadlocked only once, and it deliberated for only approximately six additionalhours after the trial court's Allen charge before reaching its verdict. Accordingly, the trialcourt did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's application for amistrial (see CPL 310.60 [1] [a]; People v Sanders, 51 AD3d at 825; People vWincelowicz, 258 AD2d at 603).
The defendant's contention that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to elicit[*2]testimony regarding the defendant's possession of apreviously-fired handgun near an elementary school is unpreserved for appellate review, as thedefendant failed to object to the alleged error at trial (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Pinto, 56 AD3d 494, 495[2008]).
Moreover, the defendant's challenges to remarks made by the prosecution during summationare unpreserved for appellate review since the defendant raised only general objections to theremarks, did not request curative instructions when his objections were sustained, and failed tomake a timely motion for a mistrial on this ground (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Almonte, 23 AD3d 392,394 [2005]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Fisher, J.P., Miller, Angiolillo andHall, JJ., concur.