| People v Maye |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 06040 [64 AD3d 795] |
| July 28, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Torrance D. Maye, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Douglas Noll and Margaret E.Mainusch of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sullivan,J.), rendered May 4, 2007, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degreeand leaving the scene of an incident without reporting, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On June 10, 2006, at approximately 10:00 p.m., an automobile driven by the defendant andowned by his sister collided with a truck on Nassau Road in Roosevelt. After the defendantbriefly approached the driver of the truck, the defendant and his passenger fled on foot, leavingthe automobile at the scene. Within a short time, the police arrived and observed a loadedrevolver on the floor of the automobile in front of the driver's seat. The defendant was arrestedtwo months later and charged, inter alia, with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree(see Penal Law former § 265.02 [4]). At the close of the People's case, thedefendant argued that the evidence establishing his possession of the revolver was insufficient.He argued further that the "automobile presumption" contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3)was inapplicable because the revolver was not found while the defendant was in the automobile,but a few minutes later.
On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the evidence was legally insufficient and thatthe court improperly instructed the jury on the automobile presumption. We disagree. Inasmuchas there was evidence that the defendant was in the car shortly before a gun was discovered inthe vehicle under circumstances which made it unlikely that the weapon was placed in the carafter the defendant exited, the court properly instructed the jury on the automobile presumption(see People v Rosenthal, 207 AD2d 364 [1994]; People v Heizman, 127 AD2d609 [1987]; cf. People v Thomas, 162 AD2d 822, 823-824 [1990]). Viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of the chargedcrimes beyond a reasonable doubt (see Matter of Tamara E., 19 AD3d 489, 489-490[2005]; People v O'Brien, 212 AD2d 741, 742 [1995]). Upon our independent reviewpursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weightof the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Fisher, J.P., Dillon, Belen andChambers, JJ., concur.