Matter of Wilson v Town of Minerva Town Bd.
2009 NY Slip Op 06214 [65 AD3d 788]
August 13, 2009
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 30, 2009


In the Matter of Phillip Wilson, Petitioner, v Town of MinervaTown Board et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Brennan & White, L.L.P., Queensbury (Eric C. Schwenker of counsel), for petitioner.

Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Maloney & Laird, P.C., Albany (Luke C. Davignon ofcounsel), for respondents.

Kane, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in Essex County) to review a determination of respondent Town ofMinerva Town Board which terminated petitioner's employment.

In 2001, respondent Town of Minerva hired petitioner as a maintenance mechanic. On hisemployment application, the question whether he had ever "been convicted of a crime(misdemeanor or felony)" was answered in the negative. In fact, petitioner had been convicted ofdriving while intoxicated (hereinafter DWI) in 1999. In 2007, petitioner was again arrested forDWI, leading to another conviction. The Town charged petitioner with incompetence due to hisconvictions and misconduct due to his answer on the employment application. After a hearingpursuant to Civil Service Law § 75, the Hearing Officer found petitioner not guilty of theincompetence charge but guilty of misconduct and recommended his termination. RespondentTown of Minerva Town Board found petitioner guilty of both charges and terminated hisemployment. Petitioner commenced this proceeding to challenge the Board's determination.Upon transfer to this Court (see CPLR 7804 [g]), we confirm.[*2]

The Town's determination to terminate petitioner'semployment must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Mapp v Burnham, 8NY3d 999, 1000 [2007]; Matter ofLongton v Village of Corinth, 57 AD3d 1273, 1274 [2008]). Petitioner admitted that hewas twice convicted of DWI. His job duties as a maintenance mechanic required him to operatemotor vehicles during the course of his employment. The Town's insurance agent testified thatpursuant to underwriting guidelines for the Town's insurance carrier, a person with two DWIconvictions is not an acceptable driver and if the Town continued to employ such a person itsinsurance carrier would not renew the current policy. The nonrenewal would occur regardless ofwhether that employee drove Town vehicles or drove his or her own vehicle on Town business.While the Town would be able to secure insurance through another carrier, the agent opined thatsuch insurance would be at a higher cost and provide reduced coverage. Thus, substantialevidence supports the finding that petitioner's off-duty conduct which led to his criminalconvictions rendered him incompetent to perform his duties without unreasonable hardship to theTown.

Substantial evidence also supports the finding of misconduct. The employment applicationcontains a false statement regarding petitioner's criminal history. Petitioner testified that he wasunaware that DWI was a crime, but also testified that his wife completed the application and hefailed to read it before signing it. Petitioner's knowledge and intent created a factual question forrespondents to resolve, which they did by accepting the Hearing Officer's finding that petitioner'stestimony regarding his knowledge was incredible (see Matter of Longton v Village ofCorinth, 57 AD3d at 1274; Matter of Williams v County of Fulton, 270 AD2d 613,615-616 [2000]). While the Hearing Officer may have drawn some conclusions which are notsupported by the record, the overall determination of misconduct is supported by substantialevidence (see Matter of Betz v WestGenesee Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 AD3d 909, 910 [2005], lv denied 5NY3d 716 [2005]). The misconduct charge was not time-barred, as petitioner's actions couldconstitute the crime of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree (seeCivil Service Law § 75 [4]; Penal Law § 175.30; Matter of Velez v New YorkCity Tr. Auth., 175 AD2d 132, 133 [1991]).

Considering the risks to the Town by continuing petitioner's employment, and that heobtained his employment through submitting an application that contained a false answer to acritical question, the penalty of termination is not so disproportionate as to shock our sense offairness (see Matter of Mapp v Burnham, 8 NY3d at 1000; Matter of Rutkunas v Stout, 8 NY3d897, 898 [2007]).

Spain, J.P., Malone Jr., Kavanagh and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Adjudged that thedetermination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.


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