| Pierson v Empire State Land Assoc., LLC |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 06525 [65 AD3d 1114] |
| September 15, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Valerie Pierson, Plaintiff, v Empire State Land Associates,LLC, et al., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants. Au Bon Pain Co., Inc., et al.,Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. (And a Second Third-PartyAction.) |
—[*1] Gordon & Silber, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Jon D. Lichtenstein of counsel), for third-partydefendants-respondents ABP Holdings, Inc., and ABP Corporation.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants third-party plaintiffsappeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Solomon, J.), dated February 29, 2008, as granted that branch of the third-party defendants'motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action forcontractual indemnification insofar as asserted against ABP Holdings, Inc., and ABPCorporation, and denied that branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment onthat third-party cause of action.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is the function of the court and the intent ofthe parties must be gleaned from the four corners of the agreement (see Jackson & Wheeler, Inc. v Village ofPleasantville, 56 AD3d 723, 724-725 [2008]). When construing the language of acontract, the court's goal is to arrive at a construction that will give fair meaning to all of thelanguage used by the parties, "and to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of theparties to the end that there [is] a realization of [their] reasonable expectations" (Partrick vGuarniere, 204 AD2d 702, 704 [1994] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
Applying those principles to the instant case, the Supreme Court properly found that thesubject lease cancellation agreement extinguished the respondents' obligation under the lease toindemnify the appellants, as the parties agreed to have certain specific obligations survive thetermination, without including the obligation to indemnify of which they were aware.Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the respondents' motion whichwas for summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for contractualindemnification insofar as asserted against them, and properly denied that branch of theappellants' cross motion which was for summary judgment on that third-party cause of action.Rivera, J.P., Florio, Dickerson and Austin, JJ., concur.