| Matter of Boddie v Alexander |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 06632 [65 AD3d 1446] |
| September 24, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Terence Boddie, Appellant, v George Alexander,as Chair of the Division of Parole, Respondent. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Frank K. Walsh of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered May 14, 2009 in AlbanyCounty, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondents' motion todismiss the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Petitioner was sentenced to 11 concurrent prison terms, the greatest of which were 6 to 18years, following his 1993 conviction of four counts of rape in the first degree, five counts ofsodomy in the first degree and two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. He was released toparole supervision in January 2005. Following a final parole revocation hearing in December2007, petitioner's parole was revoked and a time assessment of 24 months was imposed by theBoard of Parole. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in January 2008 and was notified that he haduntil May 2008 to perfect his administrative appeal, which he failed to do. In October 2008,petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the Board'sdetermination. Respondent thereafter moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitionerhad failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Supreme Court dismissed the petition.Petitioner appeals and we now affirm.
A challenge to the revocation of parole fails to state a cause of action when an administrativeappeal from the determination is not timely perfected and, thus, the petitioner has failed toexhaust his or her administrative remedies (see Matter of Thomas v Executive Dept. of Div.of Parole of State of N.Y., 285 AD2d 688, 689 [2001], appeal dismissed and lvdenied 97 [*2]NY2d 669 [2001]; People ex rel. Websterv Travis, 277 AD2d 546 [2000]). Here, the credible evidence demonstrates that petitionerfailed to perfect his administrative appeal. Nor do we find that petitioner was excused fromdoing so based upon his "mere assertion that a constitutional right is involved" (Matter ofValvano v Jones, 122 AD2d 336, 336 [1986], quoting Matter of Pfaff vColumbia-Greene Community Coll., 99 AD2d 887, 888 [1984]; see Matter of Roberts vCoughlin, 165 AD2d 964, 966 [1990]) inasmuch as his substantive claim—that theapplication of the 1997 amendments to 9 NYCRR 8005.20 (c) and (d) violated the ex post factodoctrine because he was sentenced prior to the promulgation of the amendments—hasbeen previously rejected by this Court (see Matter of Suce v Taylor, 37 AD3d 886, 887 [2007], lvdenied 9 NY3d 803 [2007]; Matter of Robinson v Bennett, 300 AD2d 715, 716[2002]).
As such, we find Supreme Court did not err in dismissing the petition for petitioner's failureto exhaust his administrative remedies.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Kane, Kavanagh and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.