| Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. vCounty of Westchester |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 06683 [65 AD3d 1226] |
| September 22, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Association,Inc., et al., Respondents, v County of Westchester et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Bartlett, McDonough, Bastone & Monaghan, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Warren J. Roth ofcounsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, thedefendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi,J.), entered February 27, 2008, as denied their motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR3211.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denyingthose branches of the defendants' motion which were to dismiss so much of those causes ofaction asserted by the plaintiffs Julian Papp and David Parker as accrued more than six yearsprior to the commencement of the action and substituting therefor a provision granting thosebranches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costspayable by the defendants.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was todismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Article XI, section 5, of thecollective bargaining agreement at issue expressly excludes, from its definition of the term"grievance," any "matter involving . . . retirement benefits." Accordingly, contraryto the defendants' contention, the plaintiffs were not obligated to exhaust the grievanceprocedure prior to commencing this action, which advances claims pertaining to their allegedright to certain retirement benefits.
"Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 'a party is precluded fromrelitigating an issue which has been previously decided against him [or her] in a prior proceedingwhere he [or she] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate such issue' " (Franklin Dev. Co., Inc. v Atlantic Mut. Ins.Co., 60 AD3d 897, 899 [2009], quoting Luscher v Arrua, 21 AD3d 1005, 1007 [2005]; see D'Arata vNew York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 NY2d 659, 664 [1990]). "The doctrine of collateralestoppel is 'intended to reduce litigation and conserve the resources of the court and litigants andit is based upon the general notion that it is not fair to permit a party to relitigate an issue that hasalready been decided against it' " (Franklin Dev. Co., Inc. v Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 60AD3d at 899, quoting Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985]). " 'The twoelements that must be satisfied to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel are that (1) [*2]the identical issue was decided in the prior action and is decisive inthe present action, and (2) the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fairopportunity to contest the prior issue' " (Franklin Dev. Co., Inc. v Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.,60 AD3d at 899, quoting Luscher v Arrua, 21 AD3d at 1007; see Kaufman v EliLilly & Co., 65 NY2d at 455). Here, the Supreme Court correctly determined that thedefendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues of whether the plaintiffWestchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. (hereinafter theWCCOBA), lacked standing to maintain this action, and whether the complaint failed to state acause of action. These arguments were previously raised by the defendants in a motion todismiss the complaint in a prior action commenced against them by the WCCOBA and 15correction officers, in which the causes of action were largely identical in substance to thoseasserted here. The Supreme Court ruled against the defendants on that motion, finding both thatthe WCCOBA had standing to maintain the action, and that the complaint adequately statedcauses of action. The defendants are, therefore, precluded from relitigating these issues, as theypreviously had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them (see generally Franklin Dev. Co., Inc. v Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d897 [2009]).
The defendants are also precluded from relitigating the issue of whether the causes of actionadvanced by the plaintiffs Julian Papp and David Parker were barred entirely by the applicablesix-year limitations period (see CPLR 213 [2]), as the Supreme Court previously foundthat the continuing nature of the alleged violations obviates such a complete bar based on thestatute of limitations.
Conversely, to the extent that the defendants argue that those claims by Papp and Parkeraccruing more than six years prior to the commencement of this action should be dismissed, andthat these plaintiffs may only assert claims for damages accruing up to six years prior to thecommencement of this action, the defendants are not barred from litigating this issue, as it wasnot raised in the earlier action. " 'As a general rule in contract cases, the cause of action accruesand the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the time of the breach' " (CSEA Empl. Benefit Fund v Warwick Val.Cent. School Dist., 36 AD3d 582, 584 [2007], quoting Matter of Prote Contr. Co. vBoard of Educ. of City of N.Y., 198 AD2d 418, 420 [1993]). " '[W]here a duty imposedprior to a limitations period is a continuing one, the statute of limitations is not a defense toactions based on breaches of that duty occurring within the limitations period' " (Matter of DeCintio v Cohalan, 18AD3d 872, 873 [2005], quoting Matter of Condo Units v New York State Div. of Hous. & CommunityRenewal, 4 AD3d 424, 425 [2004]). While a new breach occurred for statute oflimitations purposes each time that the County failed to make an allegedly required payment toPapp and Parker (see CSEA Empl. Benefit Fund v Warwick Val. Cent. School Dist., 36AD3d at 584), so much of the causes of action asserted by Papp and Parker as accrued more thansix years prior to the commencement of the instant action must be dismissed as time-barred(see State of New York v CSRI Ltd. Partnership, 289 AD2d 394, 395 [2001]; Schegv Agway, Inc., 229 AD2d 963 [1996]). Spolzino, J.P., Miller, Angiolillo and Dickerson, JJ.,concur.