| People v Gordon |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 06705 [65 AD3d 1261] |
| September 22, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Andre Gordon, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, JeanetteLifschitz, and Rona Kugler of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kohm, J.),rendered December 9, 2004, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (four counts), robberyin the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree,criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the firstdegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that there was legallyinsufficient proof of his identity (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484 [2008]; People v Reyes, 60 AD3d 873,875 [2009]). In any event, the People presented legally sufficient proof of the defendant'sidentity as one of the perpetrators (seePeople v Dolan, 2 AD3d 745, 746 [2003]; People v Jenkins, 55 AD3d 850, 851 [2008]; People vSmiley, 200 AD2d 777, 778 [1994]). In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct anindependent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342[2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses,hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410[2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not againstthe weight of the evidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The Supreme Court did not err in permitting the People to elicit evidence of a residentialbreak-in that occurred close to the scene of the charged robbery and moments thereafter, as itwas probative of the defendant's identity as a participant in the charged robbery and alsoexplained the narrative of events and the police investigation (see People v Clink, 32 AD3d 862[2006]; People v Gordon, 308 AD2d 461 [2003]). In addition, the Supreme Court did noterr in admitting evidence regarding the theft of the van allegedly used in connection with thecharged robbery, since that evidence also was probative of the defendant's identity (seePeople v Clink, 32 AD3d at 862-863; People v Gordon, 308 AD2d at 461-462; see also People v Alston, 62 AD3d806 [2009]). Further, with respect to both of those incidents, the Supreme Court properlyfound that the probative value of that evidence outweighed its potentially prejudicial effect, andprovided limiting instructions to the jury.[*2]
The remaining contentions raised in the defendant's mainbrief either relate to harmless error or are without merit.
The contentions raised in points I and II of the defendant's supplemental pro se brief areunpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, relate to harmless error.
The remaining contention raised in the defendant's supplemental pro se brief is unpreservedfor appellate review and, in any event, is without merit. Fisher, J.P., Miller, Angiolillo and Hall,JJ., concur.