Everhart v County of Nassau
2009 NY Slip Op 06796 [65 AD3d 1277]
September 29, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 4, 2009


Charles Everhart et al., Respondents,
v
County of Nassauet al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[*1]Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Patrick J. Lawlessand Debra A. Adler of counsel), for appellant County of Nassau.

Cascone & Kluepfel, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Andrew Lauri of counsel), for appellantZampini Construction Corp.

Dell, Little, Trovato & Vecere, LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. (Keri A. Wehrheim of counsel), forrespondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant County of Nassauappeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Martin, J.), dated September 29, 2008, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which wasfor leave to reargue their opposition to that branch of its motion which was for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, which had been granted in aprior order dated March 18, 2008, and, upon reargument, denied that branch of the motion, andthe defendant Zampini Construction Corp. separately appeals, as limited by its brief, from somuch of the same order dated September 29, 2008, as, upon granting that branch of the plaintiffs'motion which was for leave to reargue their opposition to that branch of its motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, which had beengranted in the order dated March 18, 2008, denied that branch of its motion.

Ordered that the order dated September 29, 2008 is reversed insofar as appealed from, on thelaw, with one bill of costs, that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to rearguetheir opposition to that branch of the motion of the defendant County of Nassau which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is denied, and, uponreargument, so much of the order dated March 18, 2008, as granted that branch of the motion ofthe defendant Zampini Construction Corp. which was for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against it is adhered to.

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of theplaintiffs' motion which was for leave to reargue their opposition to that branch of the motion ofthe defendant County of Nassau which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against it since the Supreme Court did not overlook or misapprehend the factsor law, or mistakenly arrive at its earlier decision (see CPLR 2221 [d]; McDonald v Stroh, 44 AD3d 720,721 [2007]; E.W. Howell Co., Inc. vS.A.F. La Sala Corp., 36 AD3d 653, 654 [2007]). In response to the [*2]County's demonstration of its entitlement to judgment as a matterof law, the plaintiffs failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as towhether the County had notice of the alleged defect, in this case, a piece of concrete embeddedin sand at a beach club (see Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d836 [1986]; Curiale v Sharrotts Woods,Inc., 9 AD3d 473 [2004]; Lee v Bethel First Pentecostal Church of Am., 304AD2d 798 [2003]).

Upon reargument, the Supreme Court should have adhered to its original determinationgranting that branch of the motion of the defendant Zampini Construction (hereinafter Zampini)which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Inresponse to Zampini's demonstration of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, theplaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it created the alleged defect whichcaused the injured plaintiff to trip and fall (see Collins v Laro Serv. Sys. of N.Y., Inc., 36 AD3d 746, 747[2007]; Licatese v Waldbaums, Inc., 277 AD2d 429 [2000]). In this regard, the SupremeCourt erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to this case. The evidence failed to showthat Zampini was in exclusive control of the alleged defect which caused the injured plaintiff totrip and fall (see Dermatossian v New York City Tr. Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 226 [1986]).Rivera, J.P., Florio, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.


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