| Matter of East Meadow Union Free School Dist. v New York State Div.of Human Rights |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 06840 [65 AD3d 1342] |
| September 29, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of East Meadow Union Free School District,Petitioner/Cross Respondent, v New York State Division of Human Rights,Respondent/Cross Petitioner. |
—[*1] Caroline J. Downey, Bronx, N.Y. (Michael K. Swirsky of counsel), for respondent/crosspetitioner. Michael D. B. Kavey and Hayley J. Gorenberg, New York, N.Y., for Advocates for Childrenof New York, Inc., Anti-Defamation League, Canine Companions for Independence, DisabilityAdvocates, Inc., Empire State Pride Agenda, Guide Dog Foundation for the Blind, Inc., GuidingEyes for the Blind, Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York Civil LibertiesUnion, and Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, amici curiae (one brief filed). Jay Worona and Aileen Abrams, Latham, N.Y., for New York School Boards Association,Inc., amicus curiae (one brief filed).
Proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review a determination of theCommissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights dated March 10, 2008, whichconfirmed the recommendation of an administrative law judge, made after a hearing, and foundthat the petitioner engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice on the basis of disabilityinsofar as the petitioner prevented the use of guide, hearing, and service dogs in a public schoolby students with disabilities, and the New York State Division of Human Rights cross-petitionspursuant to Executive Law § 298 to enforce the determination.
Adjudged that the petition is granted and the cross petition is denied, without costs ordisbursements, the determination is annulled, and the administrative complaint is dismissed.
In this proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298, the petitioner, East MeadowUnion Free School District (hereinafter the School District), challenges the determination of theNew York State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter the SDHR) that the School District has apolicy of discriminating against students on the basis of disability insofar as the School Districtprevented the use of guide, hearing, [*2]and service dogs inschool, in violation of Executive Law (Human Rights Law) § 296 (14). We agree with theSchool District that the statutory provision upon which the SDHR's finding is based does notapply to it. We, therefore, grant the petition, deny the SDHR's cross petition, and vacate theSDHR's determination, without reaching the issue of whether the School District had adiscriminatory policy.
Executive Law § 296 (14) prohibits discrimination "against a . . . hearingimpaired person . . . on the basis of his or her use of a . . . hearing dogor service dog." The prohibition applies to "any person engaged in any activity covered by"Executive Law § 296. The SDHR predicates the School District's obligation to complywith Executive Law § 296 (14) on the language of section 296 (4), which prohibits variousforms of discrimination by "an education corporation or association which holds itselfout to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation pursuant to the provisions ofarticle four of the real property tax law" (emphasis supplied).
The terms "education corporation" and "education association" are not defined by theExecutive Law. The General Construction Law, which establishes the meaning of terms nototherwise defined by statute (see General Construction Law § 110), does notdefine the term "education association." A corporation and an association, however, are differentthings (see Martin v Curran, 303 NY 276, 280 [1951]; Matter of Graves, 171 NY40, 47 [1902]). Since a School District is a corporation (see General Construction Law§ 66 [2]), it is not an association.
Although the General Construction Law does define both "education corporation" and"school district," it establishes that they are mutually exclusive. Pursuant to GeneralConstruction Law § 65 (a), a corporation is either a public corporation, a corporationformed other than for profit, or a corporation formed for profit (see General ConstructionLaw § 65 [a] [1]); it cannot be more than one of these. An "education corporation" is atype of corporation formed other than for profit (General Construction Law § 65 [c]). A"school district," by contrast, is a type of "municipal corporation" (General Construction Law§ 66 [2]). Since a "municipal corporation" is a public corporation (General ConstructionLaw § 66 [1]), a school district is a public corporation. Hence, a school district cannot bean "education corporation" within the meaning of Human Rights Law § 296 (4).
We adopted this logic, without discussion, in Matter of Student Press v New York StateHuman Rights Appeal Bd. (44 AD2d 558 [1974]), in which we held that Queens College ofthe City University of New York was not subject to the jurisdiction of the SDHR underExecutive Law § 296. State Div. of Human Rights v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs.(98 AD2d 958 [1983]) is not to the contrary. The board of cooperative educational services atissue there was created pursuant to Education Law former § 1950 (id. at 958) and,thus, was subject to Executive Law § 296 (4).
Since the School District thus is not an "education corporation or association" within themeaning of Executive Law § 296 (4), the petition must be granted, the cross petition mustbe denied, and the determination of the SDHR must be annulled. Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Florioand Balkin, JJ., concur.