Matter of Whitted v City of Newburgh
2009 NY Slip Op 06855 [65 AD3d 1365]
September 29, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 4, 2009


In the Matter of Thomas J. Whitted et al.,Appellants,
v
City of Newburgh, Respondent.

—[*1]Ostrer Rosenwasser, LLP, Chester, N.Y. (Moriah M. Niblack and Cynthia Dolan ofcounsel), for appellants.

Hitsman, Hoffman & O'Reilly, LLC, Tarrytown, N.Y. (Evelyn Miller of counsel), forrespondent.

In a hybrid proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 78, in effect, in the nature ofmandamus to compel the City of Newburgh to pay longevity salary increments to thepetitioners/plaintiffs pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) retroactive to May16, 2001, and action for a judgment declaring that the City of Newburgh must include longevitysalary increments in payments it is obligated to make to its firefighters pursuant to GeneralMunicipal Law § 207-a (2), the petitioners/plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of theSupreme Court, Orange County (Owen, J.), dated June 26, 2008, which, upon an order of thesame court dated March 12, 2008, granting the separate motions of the City of Newburgh forsummary judgment dismissing, as time-barred, the petition/complaint insofar as asserted by thepetitioner/plaintiff Thomas J. Whitted, the petitioners/plaintiffs Steven Briggs, William H.Rinker, and Robert Root, and the petitioners/plaintiffs Kenneth Rose, Richard Itzla, Joseph Roy,Philip Howard, Scott MacRae, and John Tucker, respectively, and denying the cross motion ofthe petitioners/plaintiffs for summary judgment, in effect, on the first cause of action declaringthat the City of Newburgh must include longevity salary increments in payments it is obligatedto make to its firefighters pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2), is in favor ofthe City of Newburgh and against them dismissing the petition/complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof in favorof the City of Newburgh and against the petitioners/plaintiffs Kenneth Rose, Richard Itzla,Joseph Roy, Philip Howard, Scott MacRae, and John Tucker dismissing the petition insofar asasserted by them and substituting therefor a provision granting the petition insofar as asserted bythose petitioners/plaintiffs to the extent of directing the City of Newburgh to pay them longevitysalary increments pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) retroactive to May 16,2001; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, that branch ofthe motion of the City of Newburgh which was for summary judgment dismissing, astime-barred, the second cause of action insofar as asserted by the petitioners/plaintiffs KennethRose, Richard Itzla, Joseph Roy, Philip Howard, Scott MacRae, and John Tucker is denied, andthe order dated March 12, 2008, is modified accordingly.

The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) are retired firefighters of the City ofNewburgh who became disabled as a result of injuries sustained in the performance of theirduties and, [*2]consequently, have been receiving their "regularsalary or wages" pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). Pursuant to the contractbetween the City and its firefighters' union, active firefighters would be entitled to longevityincreases in their pay. Relying upon our decisions in Matter of Schade v Town ofWallkill (235 AD2d 542 [1997]) and Matter of Aitken v City of Mount Vernon (200AD2d 667 [1994]), the petitioners commenced this hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article78, in effect, in the nature of mandamus to compel the City to include those longevity increasesin the payments they receive pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2), and actionfor a judgment declaring that the City is obligated to include these increments in payments itmakes pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2).

On its motions for summary judgment, the City asserted that the claims of certain of thepetitioners were untimely, and that even those claims that were timely were without merit. "Aproceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel must be commenced within fourth months afterthe refusal by the body or officer, upon the demand of the aggrieved party, to perform a dutyenjoined upon the body or officer by law" (Matter of Zupa v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Townof Southold, 64 AD3d 723, 725 [2009]; see CPLR 217 [1]). The City established,without dispute, that the petitioners William H. Rinker, Robert Root, and Steven Briggs delayedapproximately 10 years before commencing this proceeding and action (hereinafter thisproceeding) after a demand for longevity increases was made on their behalf and refused by theCity in 1997; the City further established that the petitioner Thomas J. Whitted, although not agrievant in 1997, demanded longevity payments as early as 1999. The Supreme Court, therefore,properly dismissed their cause of action asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78 in this proceeding,which was first interposed in 2007, on the ground that it was barred by the applicable four-monthlimitations period (see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of Zupa v Zoning Bd. of Appeals ofTown of Southold, 64 AD3d 723 [2009]; Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v Board ofEduc., Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist., 239 AD2d 415, 416 [1997]; Matterof Devens v Gokey, 12 AD2d 135 [1961], affd 10 NY2d 898 [1961]). The cause ofaction asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78 by Kenneth Rose, Richard Itzla, Joseph Roy, PhilipHoward, Scott MacRae, and John Tucker (hereinafter the remaining petitioners), however, wasinterposed within four months after the City rejected their demands for payment and, therefore,that cause of action is not time-barred.

Turning to the merits of the cause of action asserted by the remaining petitioners pursuant toCPLR article 78, General Municipal Law § 207-a entitles firefighters who are disabled inthe performance of their duties to, among other benefits, the continued payment of the fullamount of the firefighter's regular salary or wages until the disability has ceased (seeGeneral Municipal Law § 207-a [1]). However, the statute permits the municipality todiscontinue such payments with respect to a permanently disabled firefighter when thatfirefighter "is granted an accidental disability retirement allowance pursuant to section threehundred sixty-three of the retirement and social security law, a retirement for disability incurredin performance of duty allowance pursuant to section three hundred sixty-three-c of theretirement and social security law or similar accidental disability pension provided by thepension fund of which he [or she] is a member" (General Municipal Law § 207-a [2]). Inthat case, however, the retired firefighter "shall continue to receive from the municipality or firedistrict by which he [or she] is employed, until such time as he [or she] shall have attained themandatory service retirement age applicable to him [or her] or shall have attained the age orperformed the period of service specified by applicable law for the termination of his [or her]service, the difference between the amounts received under such allowance or pension and theamount of his [or her] regular salary or wages" (id.).

"[T]he phrase 'regular salary or wages' . . . as employed in subdivision 2 ofsection 207-a of the General Municipal Law, includes prospective salary increase given to activefire fighters subsequent to the award of an accidental disability retirement allowance or pension"(Matter of Mashnouk v Miles, 55 NY2d 80, 88 [1982]). Contrary to the City's argument,we have unambiguously held that firefighters who are receiving benefits pursuant to GeneralMunicipal Law § 207-a (2) are entitled to the benefit of longevity increases provided bycontract to active firefighters (see Matter of Aitken v City of Mount Vernon, 200 AD2d667 [1994]). The City has presented no argument that would cause us to reconsider that decision.Since the remaining petitioners thus established their clear legal rights to the relief sought, andthe City has a recognized ministerial duty to make the requested payments to the remainingpetitioners, the Supreme Court should have granted the petition insofar as asserted by theremaining petitioners.[*3]

The City's contention regarding the petitioners' claim toan award of an attorney's fee was not addressed by the Supreme Court and, therefore, is notproperly before us on this appeal.

"CPLR article 78 proceedings are summary in nature (see CPLR 409 [b]; Matterof Lakeshore Nursing Home v Axelrod, 181 AD2d 333, 340 [1992]) and, thus, a motion forsummary judgment addressed to the merits of the petition is unnecessary" (Matter of 1300Franklin Ave. Members, LLC v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Garden City, 62 AD3d1004, 1006 [2009]). Accordingly, on the petitioners' cross motion for summary judgment, theSupreme Court, in effect, only addressed the first cause of action seeking declaratory relief. Withrespect to that cause of action, however, since the legal issue in dispute here is limited to whetherthe City's obligation to include longevity salary increments in payments made pursuant toGeneral Municipal Law § 207-a (2) is one enjoined upon it by law, that issue is subject toreview only pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see CPLR 7803 [1]; Matter of Schade vTown of Wallkill, 235 AD2d at 543), thus rendering unnecessary the cause of action for ajudgment declaring that the City is obligated to include such increments in those payments(see Matter of 1300 Franklin Ave. Members, LLC v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of GardenCity, 62 AD3d at 1007; Matter of Kogel v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofHuntington, 58 AD3d 630 [2009]). Consequently, the first cause of action was properlydismissed. Spolzino, J.P., Miller, Angiolillo and Dickerson, JJ., concur.


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