Matter of Libolt v Town of Irondequoit Zoning Bd. ofAppeals
2009 NY Slip Op 06952 [66 AD3d 1393]
October 2, 2009
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2009


In the Matter of Keith P. Libolt et al., Appellants, v Town ofIrondequoit Zoning Board of Appeals et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Fix Spindelman Brovitz & Goldman, P.C., Fairport (James J. Bonsignore of counsel),for petitioners-appellants.

Harris, Chesworth, O'Brien, Johnstone, Welch & Leone, LLP, Rochester (Robert S. Leni ofcounsel), for respondents-respondents.

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (AnnMarie Taddeo, J.), entered April 14, 2008 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. Thejudgment dismissed the petition.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.

Memorandum: In May 2007, petitioner The Brotherhood of Saint Joseph, Inc. (TheBrotherhood), a religious order incorporated under the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law,purchased property located in an R-1 residential district in respondent Town of Irondequoit(Town). Thereafter, The Brotherhood began operating a temporary group housing programdesigned to facilitate the reentry into society of men who had recently been incarcerated basedon their convictions of nonviolent drug or alcohol related crimes. As a condition of residence atthe facility, The Brotherhood required each resident to sign a "Post-Release Transitional HousingContract" and to pay a per diem fee of $25. Residents were encouraged, but not required, toattend a religious service of their choice on a weekly basis.

In September 2007, the Town issued a notice of violation based upon, inter alia, itsdetermination that petitioners were operating a "halfway house," which was not a permitted usein an R-1 district. Upon petitioners' subsequent appeal to respondent Town Zoning Board ofAppeals (ZBA), the ZBA determined that petitioners were not using the property as asingle-family residence and that petitioners' use of the property primarily as a "halfway house"constituted a violation of section 235-3 of the Town's Zoning Law.

We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied the relief sought by petitioners in thisCPLR article 78 proceeding, i.e., the annulment of the ZBA's determination, and thus properly[*2]implicitly dismissed the petition.

We reject petitioners' contention that the determination was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuseof discretion, and clearly affected by errors of law." Pursuant to section 235-4 (B) of the Town'sZoning Law, a family is defined as "[a]ny number of individuals living together as a singlehousekeeping unit and doing their cooking on premises, as distinguished from a group occupyinga boarding- or rooming house or hotel." It is well settled that, "[u]nder a zoning ordinance whichauthorizes interpretation of its requirements by the board of appeals, specific application of aterm of the ordinance to a particular property is . . . governed by the board'sinterpretation, unless unreasonable or irrational" (Matter of Frishman v Schmidt, 61NY2d 823, 825 [1984]). We conclude that the ZBA's determination that petitioners did not usethe property as a single-family residence or a church within the meaning of sections 235-4 and235-8, respectively, of the Town's Zoning Law is not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse ofdiscretion, or affected by errors of law, and we further conclude that the determination issupported by substantial evidence (see generally Matter of Wind Power Ethics Group[WPEG] v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Cape Vincent, 60 AD3d 1282 [2009]; Matter of Carrier v Town of PalmyraZoning Bd. of Appeals, 30 AD3d 1036, 1037 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 807[2007]).

Contrary to the further contention of petitioners, the ZBA's interpretation of the Zoning Lawdid not place an unconstitutional restraint on their exercise of religion. The ZBA's determinationwas in furtherance of the compelling governmental interest in maintaining the R-1 district as asingle-family residential zone, and the cause of action alleging the violation of the ReligiousLand Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 must fail, inasmuch as it cannot be said thatthe ZBA's determination, i.e., the denial of permission to operate a "Transitional Housing"facility under contract with "clients" who pay a per diem fee of $25 per day for a room, "imposesa substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly orinstitution" (42 USC § 2000cc [a] [1]; see Third Church of Christ, Scientist, of N.Y.City v City of New York, 617 F Supp 2d 201, 208-209 [SD NY 2008]). Finally, we rejectthe contention of petitioners that the ZBA erred in determining that their use of the property didnot constitute the continuation of a prior nonconforming use (see Matter of P.M.S. Assets vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Pleasantville, 98 NY2d 683, 685 [2002]).Present—Smith, J.P., Centra, Fahey, Carni and Pine, JJ.


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