Matter of Tabrizi v Faxton-St. Luke's Health Care
2009 NY Slip Op 06985 [66 AD3d 1421]
October 2, 2009
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2009


In the Matter of Firooz N. Tabrizi, M.D., Appellant, v Faxton-St.Luke's Health Care, Respondent.

—[*1]Peter M. Hobaica, LLC, Utica (George E. Curtis of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.

Napierski, Vandenburgh & Napierski, LLP, Albany (Kimberly E. Kenealy of counsel), forrespondent-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (John W. Grow, J.), enteredSeptember 30, 2008. The order denied petitioner's application for an injunction pursuant toPublic Health Law § 2801-c.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner (hereafter, plaintiff) commenced this CPLR article 78 proceedingseeking to compel respondent (hereafter, defendant) to reinstate his full clinical privileges atdefendant's hospital. Supreme Court converted the proceeding into an action for an injunctionpursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-c and then refused to grant an injunction,concluding that there was a rational basis for the suspension and that plaintiff had been affordedhis full procedural rights pursuant to the applicable law and defendant's bylaws. We affirm.

Upon reviewing an application for an injunction pursuant to Public Health Law §2801-c, the court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the purported grounds forsuspending or restricting a physician's practice privileges "were reasonably related to theinstitutional concerns set forth in the statute, whether they were based on the apparent facts asreasonably perceived by the administrators, and whether they were assigned in good faith"(Fried v Straussman, 41 NY2d 376, 383 [1977], rearg denied 41 NY2d 1009[1977]; see Bhard-Waj v United Health Servs., Hosps., 303 AD2d 824, 825 [2003];Jones v Yonkers Gen. Hosp., 143 AD2d 885 [1988]). It is not within the province of thecourt to determine whether a defendant was in fact justified in suspending the plaintiff's clinicalprivileges or whether the allegations against the plaintiff were in fact accurate (see Fried,41 NY2d at 382-383). Based on the record before us, including the transcript of plaintiff's fairhearing, we agree with the court that defendant's reasons for suspending plaintiff's clinicalprivileges were properly related to the concern of defendant for the safety of its patients(see Public Health Law § 2801-b [1]). In addition, defendant's actions wereundertaken in good faith, i.e., in response to a telephone call from a physician affiliated with aninsurance company who expressed concern over plaintiff's care of a patient insured by thatcompany.[*2]

We reject plaintiff's contention that the court improperlydismissed the action, sua sponte, in the absence of a motion to dismiss by defendant. Althoughthe court in its bench decision stated that the action was dismissed, the court also stated that itwas denying "injunctive relief." In any event, having denied the relief sought in the action, it isof no moment whether the court stated in its bench decision that the action was dismissed.Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Martoche, Smith and Centra, JJ.


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