| Nancy Rose Stormer, P.C. v County of Oneida |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07022 [66 AD3d 1449] |
| October 2, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Nancy Rose Stormer, P.C., Appellant, v County of Oneida et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Linda M.H. Dillon, County Attorney, Utica (Kurt D. Parry of counsel), fordefendants-respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Samuel D. Hester, J.), enteredDecember 24, 2008 in a breach of contract action. The order denied the motion of plaintiff forsummary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the lawwithout costs and the motion is granted, and
It is further ordered that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants inthe amount of $339,291.25, together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, commencingApril 9, 2006.
Memorandum: Plaintiff, a law firm, commenced this action alleging, inter alia, thatdefendants breached their 2005 and 2006 contracts with plaintiff pursuant to which plaintiffsecured reimbursement for certain of defendants' Medicaid expenditures referred to as "620/621claims." We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in denying its motion for summaryjudgment on the breach of contract cause of action inasmuch as it established its entitlement tojudgment as a matter of law with respect thereto, and defendants failed to raise a triable issue offact (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).
Contrary to the contention of defendants, we conclude that the contracts are unambiguouswith respect to plaintiff's authority to negotiate a settlement on their behalf with the State of NewYork concerning the 620/621 claims. It is well settled that "[t]he interpretation of anunambiguous contractual provision is 'a function for the court' " (Pyramid Brokerage Co. of Buffalo, Inc. vAtlas Auto Glass, Inc., 39 AD3d 1176, 1177 [2007], quoting Teitelbaum Holdings vGold, 48 NY2d 51, 56 [1979]), and "[t]he proper inquiry in determining whether a contractis ambiguous is 'whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than oneinterpretation' " (Arrow Communication Labs. v Pico Prods., 206 AD2d 922, 922-923[1994], quoting Chimart Assoc. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570, 573 [1986]). "To be entitled tosummary judgment, the moving party has the burden of establishing that its construction of the[contract] 'is the only construction which can fairly be placed thereon' " (Jellinick v Naples &Assoc., 296 AD2d 75, 78-79 [2002]; see Syracuse Orthopedic Specialists, P.C. v Hootnick, 42 AD3d890, 891 [2007]). Here, plaintiff met that burden. Pursuant to the [*2]plain wording of both contracts, plaintiff was to "[p]rovide all legalrepresentation necessary to properly substantiate and administratively process such 620/621claims . . . [and n]egotiate with any appropriate agencies and offices." Thecontracts further provided that defendants "shall pay [plaintiff] for such services at a rate of 25%[of defendants'] share of all recoveries, reimbursements or offsets received by [defendants]." Wethus agree with plaintiff that the only reasonable interpretation of that language is that plaintiffwas required to negotiate with the State of New York on defendants' behalf, and that defendantswere required to pay plaintiff 25% of the amount that they received in the settlement of their620/621 claims. We therefore reverse the order, grant the motion and direct that judgment beentered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants in the amount of $339,291.25, together withinterest at the rate of 9% per annum, commencing April 9, 2006. Pursuant to the contracts,payment was due 15 days from the date on which plaintiff submitted its request for payment and,here, plaintiff submitted its request for payment on March 25, 2006 (see CPLR 5001 [b];see also Eisen v Feder, 47 AD3d595, 596-597 [2008]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Carni, Pine and Gorski, JJ.