People v Sene
2009 NY Slip Op 07160 [66 AD3d 427]
October 6, 2009
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2009


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Wahid Sene, Appellant.

[*1]The Legal Aid Society, New York (Steven Banks of counsel), and White & Case LLP,New York (Julia Winters of counsel), for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Paula-Rose Stark of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (A. Kirke Bartley, J.), rendered on March 19,2007, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of sexual abuse in the first degree and criminaltrespass in the second degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of three years,unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). Except for his claim that his conduct did not constitute sexualcontact as defined in Penal Law § 130.00 (3), defendant's challenges to the sufficiency andweight of the evidence are attacks on the credibility of prosecution witnesses, and we find nobasis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations.

The conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree is premised on nonconsensual contactbetween defendant's mouth and the victim's neck. Penal Law § 130.00 (3) defines sexualcontact as "any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person . . . for thepurpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party." Defendant argues that because the neck isnot located in proximity to sexual organs and is not generally covered with clothing, it cannot beconsidered an intimate part of the body.

The Court of Appeals has cautioned against "hypertechnical or strained interpretations" ofthe sexual abuse statute (People v Ditta, 52 NY2d 657, 660 [1981]). We conclude that,under general societal norms, the neck qualifies as an intimate part because it is sufficientlypersonal or private that it would not be touched in the absence of a close relationship betweenthe parties. Moreover, since "intimacy is a function of behavior and not merely anatomy," themanner and circumstances of the touching should also be considered (People v Graydon,129 Misc 2d 265, 268 [Crim Ct, NY County 1985]), and we reject defendant's argument that todo so would conflate the sexual gratification element with the issue of whether a body part is anintimate part. Here, defendant stripped naked, climbed onto the sleeping victim, and licked herneck. This conduct clearly fell within "the plain, natural meaning" (People v Ditta, 52NY2d at 660) of the statute. The court properly precluded defendant from eliciting testimonythat he made an [*2]exculpatory statement in the course of theincident. This was essentially a factual assertion of his innocence constituting hearsay, and therewas no relevant basis upon which to receive it other than for its truth (see People vReynoso, 73 NY2d 816, 819 [1988]; People v Perry, 223 AD2d 479 [1996]). In anyevent, the precluded testimony was substantially similar to defendant's exculpatory statementmade to a 911 operator, which was in evidence. The court's ruling did not impair defendant'sright to confront witnesses and present a defense (see Crane v Kentucky, 476 US 683,689-690 [1986]).

The prosecutor's summation comment on the victim's demeanor while testifying wasappropriate. Defendant's remaining challenges to the summation are unpreserved and we declineto review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal(see People v Overlee, 236 AD2d 133 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 976 [1998];People v D'Alessandro, 184 AD2d 114, 118-119 [1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 884[1993]).

The court correctly charged the jury that a sleeping person, being unconscious, can beconsidered to be physically helpless and incapable of consenting to sexual contact (seee.g. People v Bush, 57 AD3d1119 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 756 [2009]). The charge, read as a whole,conveyed that it was for the jury to decide whether the victim's state of being asleep constitutedphysical helplessness within the meaning of Penal Law § 130.00 (7).

Motion seeking to dismiss appeal denied. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Sweeny, Moskowitz,Acosta and Richter, JJ.


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