| Davidson v State of New York |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07172 [66 AD3d 1089] |
| October 8, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Chester Davidson, Appellant, v State of New York,Respondent. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), forrespondent.
Mercure, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Milano, J.), entered August 28,2008, which, among other things, granted summary judgment in defendant's favor and dismissedthe claim.
Claimant, a prison inmate, was involved in an altercation with another inmate and wasimmediately confined to the special housing unit (hereinafter SHU). Although he was foundguilty of violating two prison rules following a tier III disciplinary hearing, the Hearing Officer'sguilty determination was overturned on administrative appeal. Claimant commenced this actionseeking monetary damages for his alleged wrongful confinement in the SHU. The Court ofClaims denied claimant's motion for summary judgment and, sua sponte, granted summaryjudgment to defendant and dismissed the claim. Claimant now appeals.
Preliminarily, we observe "that actions of correctional facility employees with respect toinmate discipline matters are quasi-judicial in nature and, unless the employees exceed the scopeof their authority or violate the governing statutes and regulations, [defendant] has absoluteimmunity for those actions" (Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765, 765[2001]). Claimant contends that absolute immunity does not apply herein because his tier IIIdisciplinary hearing was untimely under the relevant regulation, and because he was allegedlyconfined to the SHU for 31 days despite the Hearing Officer's imposition of a 30-dayconfinement penalty. We [*2]disagree and affirm.
As relevant here, a disciplinary hearing should be held within seven days of an inmate'sconfinement for a disciplinary infraction (see 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]). Nevertheless, thetime requirements set forth in 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 are directory, not mandatory, and an inmatemust demonstrate prejudice as a result of any delay prior to the commencement of such a hearing(see Matter of Bilbrew v Goord, 33AD3d 1107, 1108 [2006]). Here, although claimant's disciplinary hearing concededlyoccurred eight days after his initial confinement, the record lacks any evidence that claimantsuffered prejudice from the one-day delay such that a violation of the regulation giving rise to acause of action can be deemed to have occurred (see Matter of Chaney v Goord, 26 AD3d 605, 606-607 [2006]).
Claimant's remaining contention is similarly unavailing. He was confined to the SHU onAugust 15, 2007, the same day that the altercation took place. Inasmuch as that day is notconsidered when calculating the length of his penalty, he was appropriately released after 30days on September 14, 2007 (see General Construction Law § 20; see generally Matter of Vasquez vGoord, 14 AD3d 903, 904 [2005]). Accordingly, the Court of Claims properly awardedsummary judgment to defendant and dismissed the claim (see Mitchell v State of New York, 32 AD3d 594, 595 [2006]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10AD3d 825, 826 [2004]).
Spain, Malone Jr., Kavanagh and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.