| People v Lacey |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07276 [66 AD3d 704] |
| October 6, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Richard Lacey, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Robert A. Schwartz and Laurie K.Gibbons of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Calabrese,J.), rendered May 17, 2005, convicting him of burglary in the second degree (two counts) andcriminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing pursuant to a stipulation inlieu of motions, of the suppression of identification testimony, physical evidence, and thedefendant's statements to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the hearing court properly declined to suppressidentification testimony, physical evidence, and his statements to law enforcement officials.While under the New York State Constitution, in the absence of exigent circumstances, theinstallation and use of a global positioning system (hereinafter GPS) tracking device to monitoran individual's whereabouts requires a warrant supported by probable cause (see People v Weaver, 12 NY3d433, 447 [2009]), reversal is not warranted in this case based on the failure of the police toobtain a warrant before installing a GPS to a vehicle not owned by the defendant. "[A]s a matterof State constitutional law, a defendant seeking to challenge a search and seizure [cannot] restupon the fact that the People [have] charged possession [of the automobile on which the GPSwas placed], but [is] required to demonstrate a personal legitimate expectation of privacyin the [vehicle]" (People v Wesley, 73 NY2d 351, 357 [1989] [emphasis added]; seePeople v Ponder, 54 NY2d 160, 165 [1981]; see also Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128,143 [1978]). Generally, "[w]hether [a] defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy [in theobject of the search or seizure] is a substantively different and broader question than whether he. . . has a possessory interest in it. While [a] defendant's exercise of dominion andcontrol over [the object of the search or seizure] may establish constructive possession of it, alegitimate expectation of privacy turns on consideration of all of the surrounding circumstances,including but not limited to defendant's possessory interest" (People v Ramirez-Portoreal,88 NY2d 99, 109 [1996]; see People v Rodriguez, 69 NY2d 159, 163 [1987]; seealso United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83, 91-92 [1980]).[*2]
Here, the defendant was required to establish theexistence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the subject vehicle either through his ownevidence or by relying on evidence presented by the People (see People v Whitfield, 81NY2d 904, 906 [1993]; People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 950, 951 [1986]; People v Bell, 9 AD3d 492, 494[2004]). The hearing court properly determined that the defendant failed to do so. The defendantdid not proffer any evidence at the hearing. Rather, the defendant relied on the People's evidence,which failed to establish a factual predicate to support his contention that he had a legitimateexpectation of privacy in the subject vehicle (see People v Ponder, 54 NY2d at 165;People v De Moss, 106 AD2d 395 [1984]; see also People v Rodriguez, 69NY2d 159, 164 [1987]). The evidence before the court at the time of the suppression hearingmerely demonstrated that the subject vehicle, which had been identified by multipleeyewitnesses as to make, model, license plate number, and color, as the vehicle used in thecommission of a series of burglaries beginning in July 2002, was registered to the defendant'sgirlfriend as of August 29 or 30, 2002, when the GPS was placed on the vehicle. The evidencepresented at the hearing also showed that the defendant and his girlfriend got married betweenthe time when the GPS was placed on the vehicle and the time when the subject burglaries tookplace approximately two weeks later.
Further, notably absent from the evidence presented at the hearing was any testimonyregarding the defendant's use of the subject vehicle at any time other than during the commissionof the subject burglaries (see People v Rodriguez, 69 NY2d at 162; People v DiLucchio, 115 AD2d 555, 557 [1985]; cf. People v Hernandez, 218 AD2d 167, 170[1996]; Rakas v Illinois, 439 US at 141 n 9). Indeed, a detective testified thatapproximately one week prior to the subject burglaries, he observed the defendant driving adifferent vehicle to the home of the registered owner of the subject vehicle. Similarly absent wasany evidence that the defendant took precautions to maintain privacy in the subject vehicle orthat he had the right to exclude others therefrom (see People v Rodriguez, 69 NY2d at162; People v York, 304 AD2d 681 [2003]; People v Cacioppo, 104 AD2d 559,560 [1984]; see also Rakas v Illinois, 439 US at 143 n 12). Accordingly, in view of thepaucity of evidence, the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing standing bydemonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the subject vehicle (see People vRamirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d at 108; People v Whitfield, 81 NY2d at 906; Peoplev Rodriguez, 69 NY2d at 163; People v Brown, 190 AD2d 1003, 1004 [1993]).
The defendant also contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel becausehis hearing counsel failed to proffer any evidence on the standing issue based on counsel'smistaken belief that the People had conceded that issue. However, the defendant's contention isbelied by the record, as his hearing counsel's extensive cross-examination of the People'switnesses expressly addressed the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The mere fact thatcounsel's strategy not to call a witness at the hearing regarding the defendant's use of the subjectvehicle ultimately proved unsuccessful does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel(see People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 146-147 [1981]; People v Crevelle, 122AD2d 153 [1986]). Moreover, under the totality of the circumstances presented in this record,we cannot say that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel under either theFederal or State Constitution (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984];People v Baldi, 54 NY2d at 147).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Santucci, Belen andChambers, JJ., concur.