| Matter of Isabella Star G. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07469 [66 AD3d 536] |
| October 20, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Isabella Star G., a Child Alleged to be PermanentlyNeglected. Elizabeth G. et al., Appellants; Episcopal Social Services,Respondent. |
—[*1] Steven N. Feinman, White Plains, for Silvio G., appellant. Magovern & Sclafani, New York (Joanna M. Roberson of counsel), for respondent. Neal D. Futerfas, White Plains, Law Guardian.
Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Sidney Gribetz, J.), entered on or aboutJuly 2, 2007, which, following a fact-finding determination that respondent mother hadpermanently neglected the child and that respondent father's consent was not required for thechild's adoption, terminated respondent mother's parental rights and committed custody andguardianship of the child to petitioner agency and the Commissioner of Social Services for thepurpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The finding of permanent neglect is supported by clear and convincing evidence (Matter of Lionel Burton W., 30 AD3d355 [2006]). The agency's efforts included scheduling regular visitation between mother andchild, and referring and encouraging the mother to attend and complete a drug treatmentprogram. The record clearly and convincingly shows that despite those efforts, respondent failedto complete a drug treatment program and failed to attend all of her scheduled visits with thechild.
Respondent mother's contention that the agency did not meet its burden because it did notmake sufficiently diligent efforts to provide psychological or psychiatric services is withoutmerit. Indeed, an agency's focus on a parent's major problem, here, drug addiction, is the mostappropriate course of action (Matter of Michael M., 172 AD2d 152 [1991]). In anyevent, the agency in fact made various referrals to both psychological and psychiatric services inwhich respondent mother failed to participate.
The court's findings regarding the best interests of the child were supported by apreponderance of the evidence, highlighting the positive environment provided by the fostermother and her desire to adopt the child, which was in furtherance of the goal of finding a [*2]permanent home for this child (see Matter of Taaliyah Simone S.D., 28 AD3d 371 [2006]).Despite belated efforts to rehabilitate herself, a suspended judgment was not warranted sincerespondent mother had not completed a drug program and there was no evidence as to how sheplanned to provide this child with an adequate and stable home (see Matter of Rutherford Roderick T.,4 AD3d 213 [2004]). Indeed, the child should not be denied permanence through adoptionin order to provide respondent mother with more time to demonstrate that she can be a fit parent(see Matter of Jada Serenity H., 60AD3d 469 [2009]).
Respondent mother's argument that she was prejudiced due to the length of the proceedingswas raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved. Were we to review thisissue, we would find that the length of the proceedings was not prejudicial.
Respondent father's consent to the adoption of this child was not required since he did notmaintain "substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child" (Domestic RelationsLaw § 111 [1] [d]). The record shows that respondent father failed to provide financialsupport according to his means while the child was in foster care and that his visitation with thechild was sporadic (Matter of NormanChristian K., 60 AD3d 542 [2009]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Buckley, Catterson,Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.