| People v Asai |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07529 [66 AD3d 1138] |
| October 22, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric Asai,Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Christopher D. Horn of counsel), forrespondent.
Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lamont, J.), rendered December 17,2004 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal possessionof a forged instrument in the second degree (10 counts) and grand larceny in the third degree.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with 10 counts of criminal possession of a forgedinstrument in the second degree and one count of grand larceny in the third degree arising out ofhis repeated application for and misuse of Price Chopper's "AdvantEdge" courtesy cards(hereinafter AdvantEdge card) in various stores located throughout Albany County from October2003 through January 2004. While processing AdvantEdge card applications, Price Chopper'sstaff discovered multiple applications, each bearing defendant's correct name, address, telephonenumber and date of birth, but containing different driver's license identificationnumbers.[FN1]A subsequent search of Price Chopper's database revealed that 10 of the AdvantEdge cardsissued to defendant had been blocked from further use as a result of being associated withreturned [*2]checks. A formal investigation revealed thatdefendant had used the various AdvantEdge cards to negotiate checks written on his own bankaccounts that had either been closed or contained insufficient funds, resulting in Price Chopper'sloss of merchandise and cash totaling $5,331.82.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all charges. Supreme Court thereaftersentenced defendant to 11 consecutive prison terms of 3½ to 7 years,[FN2]plus restitution. Defendant now appeals.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was not legally sufficient to establish the charges ofcriminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. We agree. Establishment of aprima facie case of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree requires thePeople to prove, among other things, that defendant knowingly uttered or possessed a forgedinstrument—meaning one that "has been falsely made, completed or altered" (Penal Law§ 170.00 [7])—with the intent to defraud, deceive or injure another (seePenal Law § 170.25; People vCunningham, 2 NY3d 593, 596 [2004]; People v Levitan, 49 NY2d 87, 90[1980]; People v Seavey, 305 AD2d 937, 938 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 624[2003]). "A person 'falsely makes' a written instrument when he [or she] makes . . .[an] instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker. . . , but which is not such either because the ostensible maker . . . isfictitious or because, if real, he [or she] did not authorize the making . . . thereof"(Penal Law § 170.00 [4]). Significantly, "[t]he forged character of a document does notdepend so much on whether it contains a falsehood, but on whether, on its face, it misrepresentsits authenticity" (People v Briggins, 50 NY2d 302, 306 [1980]). " 'The distinction to bedrawn is the difference between an instrument which is falsely made, and one that is madefalsely' " (People v Adkins, 236 AD2d 850, 850 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 854[1997], quoting People v Cannarozzo, 62 AD2d 503, 504 [1978], affd for reasonsstated below 48 NY2d 687 [1979]).
Here, in completing the AdvantEdge card applications, defendant provided his own name,address, telephone number and date of birth. The applications were made by the person who wasauthorized to do so (see People v Adkins, 236 AD2d at 850-851). Although defendantgave fictitious driver's license numbers, he did not represent himself to be anyone other than EricAsai. While defendant's conduct was clearly fraudulent, under these circumstances, since "theostensible maker and the actual maker [of the applications] are one and the same, there can be noforgery under the statute" (People v Cunningham, 2 NY3d at 597; see People vAsaro, 94 NY2d 792, 793 [1999]; see also People v Briggins, 50 NY2d at 308;People v Levitan, 49 NY2d at 89-90 [property deeds contained false information butwere not falsely made]; People vBarton, 28 AD3d 943, 944 [2006]; People v Adkins, 236 AD2d at 850-851).Thus, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find no validline of reasoning or permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to conclude that theproof was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of the 10 counts of criminal possession ofa forged instrument in the second degree (see generally People v Lynch, 95 NY2d 243,247 [2000]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Maricevic, 52 AD3d1043, 1044 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 790 [2008]; People v Luck, 294AD2d 618, 619 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 699 [2002]).[*3]
Turning next to his conviction of grand larceny in thethird degree, defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in permitting the People to aggregatethe amounts of the individual bad checks so as to convict him of one count of grand larceny, asopposed to multiple counts of petit larceny.[FN3]Specifically, defendant argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a convictionof grand larceny in the third degree requires proof of a single larcenous scheme executed over aperiod of time. Defendant's failure to request such jury charge and to object to Supreme Court'scharge as given renders this claim unpreserved for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Ryan, 46 AD3d 1125,1127-1128 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 939 [2008]). Nor do we perceive any basis toexercise our interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]; People vRenford, 125 AD2d 967, 967 [1986], lv denied 69 NY2d 885 [1987]).
We find no merit to any of defendant's challenges to various rulings concerning theadmissibility of evidence. First, with respect to the admission of identification evidence, after thePeople initially offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the pretrial photo array was notunduly suggestive (see People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 335 [1990], cert denied498 US 833 [1990]; People vMeans, 35 AD3d 975, 976 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 948 [2007]; People v Chatham, 55 AD3d1045, 1045-1046 [2008]), defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating otherwise(see People v Chatham, 55 AD3d at 1046). Inasmuch as the record supports denial byCounty Court (Breslin, J.) of defendant's motion to suppress the pretrial identification (see People v Ramos, 48 AD3d984, 987 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 938 [2008]), the in-court identificationsobtained therefrom were also admissible (see People v Deshields, 24 AD3d 1112, 1112-1113 [2005], lvdenied 6 NY3d 811 [2006]).
We also find no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's admission of certain evidence ofdefendant's uncharged crimes and prior bad acts (see People v Rojas, 97 NY2d 32, 37-38[2001]; People v Adams, 39 AD3d1081, 1082 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 872 [2007]). After determining that theidentity exception to the Molineux rule was applicable (see People v Alvino, 71NY2d 233, 242 [1987]; People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]; People v Fuller, 50 AD3d 1171,1176 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 788 [2008]), Supreme Court properly conducted ahearing and weighed the probative value of defendant's prior convictions and bad acts againsttheir prejudicial effect (see People v Rojas, 97 NY2d at 37-38; People v Adams,39 AD3d at 1082). Notably, Supreme Court also gave appropriate limiting instructions to thejury regarding this evidence.
Defendant's contentions with regard to the admissibility of testimony concerning certainhandwriting exemplars and with regard to the sentence imposed are rendered academic by theforegoing decision. To the extent not specifically addressed herein, we have revieweddefendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Kavanagh and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment ismodified, on the law, by reversing defendant's convictions of criminal possession of a forgedinstrument in the second degree under the first 10 counts of the indictment; said countsdismissed and the sentences imposed thereon vacated; and, [*4]asso modified, affirmed.
Footnote 1: The card provides cardholderswith, among other things, check cashing privileges. According to company representatives, onlyone card is issued per customer and the cards are tracked according to the applicant's driver'slicense identification number.
Footnote 2: By operation of law, thissentence was reduced to an aggregate sentence of 10 to 20 years (see Penal Law §70.30 [1] [b], [e] [i]).
Footnote 3: None of the individual checksexceeded $3,000 (see Penal Law § 155.35).