| Matter of Ivan O. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07640 [66 AD3d 904] |
| October 20, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Ivan O., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Deborah A. Brenner ofcounsel; Ella A. Capone on the brief), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal isfrom an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated January 6,2009, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated December 2, 2008, made after ahearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would haveconstituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in thefourth degree, and menacing in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent andplaced him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for aperiod of 18 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated December 2,2008.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the part of thepetition alleging menacing in the third degree is facially insufficient because it misidentified thecomplainant (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, the petition, taken together with thesupporting deposition, clearly apprised the appellant of the conduct which is the subject of theaccusation (see Matter of Charlene D., 214 AD2d 561, 562 [1995]; Matter ofFrederick QQ., 209 AD2d 832, 833 [1994]). The appellant likewise failed to preserve forappellate review his contention that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficientevidence (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987];Matter of Kenyetta F., 49 AD3d540 [2008]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constitutedattempted robbery in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, andmenacing in the third degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 160.10 [1];§§ 110.00, 155.30 [5]; § 120.15). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factualreview power, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not againstthe weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; cf. CPL 470.15[5]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]). The evidence of the appellant's conduct before, during, and after the acts,established beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted in concert with other assailants to committhe charged acts (see Matter of JonathanV., 43 AD3d 470 [2007]; Matter of Justice G., 22 AD3d 368 [2005]; Matter of Joseph J.,205 AD2d 777 [1994]; Matter [*2]of Aida S., 189AD2d 818, 819 [1993]). Mastro, J.P., Fisher, Angiolillo and Leventhal, JJ., concur.