Matter of Raheem v New York State Bd. of Parole
2009 NY Slip Op 07710 [66 AD3d 1270]
October 29, 2009
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2009


In the Matter of Shua'Aib A. Raheem, Appellant, v New York StateBoard of Parole, Respondent.

—[*1]Lawrence Mark Stern, New York City, for appellant.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Marcus J. Mastracco of counsel), forrespondent.

Spain, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered October 8, 2008in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, to, among other things, prohibit respondent from commencing a parole rescissionhearing.

In 1973, petitioner and three codefendants robbed a sporting goods store in Brooklyn and,during an ensuing standoff with police, petitioner and his cohorts held 12 people hostage andexchanged gunfire with police, killing one police officer and injuring two others. Petitioner wasconvicted of depraved indifference murder, felony murder, manslaughter, assault and recklessendangerment, as well as several counts of criminal possession of a dangerous weapon,kidnapping, robbery and grand larceny. He was sentenced to multiple concurrent terms ofimprisonment, the aggregate of which is 25 years to life.

In November 2007, after his sixth appearance before respondent, petitioner—then age58—was granted parole. In granting parole, respondent noted petitioner's receipt ofmultiple college degrees, his leadership role in the prison's Youth Assistance Program, his workin the area of restorative justice, and a codefendant had been granted parole about 10 yearsearlier. After being notified of petitioner's impending release, a number of the victims ofpetitioner's [*2]crimes were granted an opportunity to givestatements to respondent. During three days of victim impact hearings, two of the hostages, oneof the injured police officers and the widow and other members of the slain officer's family gavestatements describing the effect of petitioner's crimes upon their lives. On December 26, 2007,after the initial hearing, respondent temporarily suspended petitioner's release. On February 8,2008, after the final hearing, respondent scheduled a rescission hearing to consider whether torescind its grant of parole, citing victim impact information provided at the hearings that was notpreviously known to it. Petitioner then commenced this proceeding seeking to prohibitrespondent from holding the scheduled rescission hearing, alleging that respondent's actions ininitiating rescission proceedings were in excess of its jurisdiction. Respondent has grantedpetitioner's continued requests for adjournments of the hearing. Supreme Court ultimatelydismissed petitioner's application and he now appeals.

The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is available where a "body or officer proceeded, isproceeding or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction" (CPLR 7803 [2]; seeMatter of Town of Huntington v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 82 NY2d 783, 786[1993]). Prohibition may be maintained in order to prevent a body or officer acting in a judicialor quasi-judicial capacity from acting in excess of its jurisdiction, provided there is a clear legalright to relief (see Matter of Garner vNew York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 NY3d 358, 361-362 [2008]; Matterof Maisonet v Merola, 69 NY2d 965, 966 [1987]), but may not be used as a "means ofseeking collateral review of a mere error of law in the administrative process" (Matter of Doev Axelrod, 71 NY2d 484, 490 [1988]; see Matter of Rush v Mordue, 68 NY2d 348,353 [1986]; La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d 575, 580 [1975], cert denied 424 US 968[1976]). Even when the requirements for a writ of prohibition are met, courts have discretion and"must consider other factors such as the gravity of the potential harm caused by the threatenedexcess of power or whether other proceedings in law or equity could correct the flaw"(Matter of Town of Huntington v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 82 NY2d at786; see Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 NY3d at362; La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d at 579; Matter of Schmitt v Skovira, 53 AD3d 918, 921 [2008]). Where apetitioner "has access to another adequate legal remedy," prohibition will not lie (Matter ofTown of Huntington v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 82 NY2d at 786).

Under 9 NYCRR 8002.5 (b) (2) (i), parole release may be temporarily suspended orrescinded based upon "significant information which existed . . . where suchinformation was not known by [respondent]."[FN*]Under Executive Law § 259-i, respondent must consider any statement made by thevictims (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c][A] [v]). This Court has previouslyconcluded that victim impact statements can constitute significant information which, whensubmitted to respondent even after its determination, may justify the temporary suspension orrescission of parole and, thus, respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction by scheduling arescission [*3]hearing here (see Matter of Pugh v New York State Bd. of Parole, 19 AD3d 991,992-993 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 713 [2005]; see also People ex rel. Victory vHerbert, 277 AD2d 933 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 705 [2001]). As none of thevictims had previously submitted any victim impact statements, their statements constitutedsignificant information not previously known by respondent (see Matter of Pugh v New YorkState Bd. of Parole, 19 AD3d at 993; see also Matter of Ortiz v New York State Bd. ofParole, 239 AD2d 52, 56 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 811 [1998]). Notably, it doesnot appear that any of the victims who gave statements before respondent had ever beenpersonally interviewed by the Probation Department. Petitioner's argument that these statementsare not new information because respondent could anticipate the impact of the crimes on thevictims is without merit, as their actual subjective experience is clearly significant informationpreviously unknown to respondent (see Matter of Pugh v New York State Bd. of Parole,19 AD3d at 993; 9 NYCRR 8002.4 [d] [6]).

We also find unavailing petitioner's contention that respondent acted outside of its statutoryand regulatory authority in holding victim impact hearings after a parole determination wasmade. Neither Executive Law § 259-i nor CPL 440.50 requires that victims' statements besubmitted prior to the parole determination to be considered (see e.g. Matter of Pugh v NewYork State Bd. of Parole, 19 AD3d at 993). In fact, 9 NYCRR 8002.5 grants respondent thediscretionary authority to rescind or modify any of its decisions (see 9 NYCRR 8002.5[d]). While 9 NYCRR 8002.4 (d) contemplates that victim impact statements will precede paroledeterminations, it also provides that respondent may waive any filing deadlines or otherlimitations on the victims' right to be heard so as to "ensur[e] that crime victims are treated withfairness, sensitivity and dignity" (9 NYCRR 8002.4 [d]). Therefore, as these statutes andregulations are intended to facilitate the right of victims to be heard, limited only by practicalconsiderations, they should not be interpreted so as to preclude victims from exercising the rightsthat they are meant to promote (see Matter of Pugh v New York State Bd. of Parole, 19AD3d at 993; 9 NYCRR 8002.4 [a]). Inasmuch as respondent has not exceeded, or threatened toexceed, its jurisdiction, Supreme Court properly denied petitioner's request for a writ ofprohibition (see CPLR 7803 [2]; Matter of Pugh v New York State Bd. of Parole,19 AD3d at 993).

We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find they do not entitle him to awrit of prohibition.

Mercure, J.P., Malone Jr., Kavanagh and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentis affirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *: While substantial evidence mustsupport a decision to rescind parole (seeMatter of Brooks v Travis, 19 AD3d 901, 901-902 [2005]; Matter of Bishop vSmith, 299 AD2d 777, 778 [2002]; 9 NYCRR 8002.5 [d] [1]; see also Matter of Rizo vNew York State Bd. of Parole, 251 AD2d 997, 997-998 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d811 [1998]), only the existence of significant new information is required to support respondent'sdecision to temporarily suspend parole or hold a rescission hearing (see 9 NYCRR8002.5 [b] [2] [i]).


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