| Aguilar v Alonzo |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07775 [66 AD3d 927] |
| October 27, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Osmin Aguilar, Appellant, v Clara Alonzo et al.,Respondents, et al., defendants. |
—[*1] James G. Bilello, Westbury, N.Y. (Patricia McDonagh of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated November 5, 2008, which granted themotion of the defendants Clara Alonzo and Auguste Shurland for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendantsClara Alonzo and Auguste Shurland for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against them is denied.
A vehicle owned by the defendant Clara Alonzo and operated by the defendant AugusteShurland (hereinafter the Shurland vehicle) allegedly came to a sudden stop in the right-handlane of the Van Wyck Expressway. The defendant Juan Sanchez, who was trailing the Shurlandvehicle in a tractor-trailer, testified at his deposition that he then brought his vehicle to acomplete stop about 20 feet behind the Shurland vehicle. The plaintiff's vehicle then collidedwith the rear of the Sanchez vehicle.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries. Alonzo andShurland moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted againstthem. The Supreme Court granted the motion. We reverse. Alonzo and Shurland failed to make aprima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law (seeAlvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). The evidence submitted by Alonzoand Shurland failed to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of fact regarding whetherShurland's conduct set in motion a foreseeable chain of events that resulted in the collisionbetween the plaintiff's vehicle and the Sanchez vehicle (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 907 [2008]). Thefact that Sanchez was able to stop his vehicle without striking the Shurland vehicle does notestablish that Shurland's conduct was not a proximate cause of the collision between theplaintiff's vehicle and the Sanchez vehicle (id. at 908). Accordingly, the Supreme Courtshould have denied the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposing papers(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324). Fisher, J.P., Covello, Dickerson andLott, JJ., concur.