Moyse v Wagner
2009 NY Slip Op 07808 [66 AD3d 976]
October 27, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2009


Patrick Moyse, Plaintiff,
v
Jacob Wagner, Appellant, andPoritz and Associates, LLC, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[*1]Ronald J. Mazzucco, Staten Island, N.Y., for appellant. Harvey Gladstein & Partners,LLC, New York, N.Y. (John J. Bruno and Jan B. Rothman of counsel), forrespondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Jacob Wagner appealsfrom so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (McMahon, J.), datedOctober 17, 2008, as denied his motion for leave to amend his answer to assert a cross claim forindemnification against the defendants Poritz and Associates, LLC, and Alan Poritz.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the contention of the defendant Jacob Wagner, the Supreme Court properlydenied his motion for leave to amend his answer to assert a cross claim for indemnificationagainst the defendants Poritz and Associates, LLC, and Alan Poritz (hereinafter together thePoritz defendants). Leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given upon such terms as may bejust" (CPLR 3025 [b]; see Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959[1983]) as long as the proposed amendment is not palpably insufficient or devoid of merit (see Bolanowski v Trustees of ColumbiaUniv. in City of N.Y., 21 AD3d 340, 341 [2005]; Glaser v County of Orange, 20 AD3d 506 [2005]; Ortega v Bisogno & Meyerson, 2AD3d 607, 609 [2003]). Accordingly, in considering a motion for leave to amend, it isincumbent upon the court to examine the sufficiency and merits of the proposed amendment (see Hill v 2016 Realty Assoc., 42AD3d 432, 433 [2007]; see e.g.Abrahamian v Tak Chan, 33 AD3d 947, 949 [2006]; Fisher v Braun, 227 AD2d586, 587 [1996]).

In this case, Wagner's proposed cross claim was devoid of merit (see e.g. Beja v Meadowbrook Ford, 48AD3d 495, 496 [2008]; Ross vGidwani, 47 AD3d 912, 913 [2008]), since the contractual provisions upon which it waspremised were clearly irrelevant to the issue of Wagner's potential tort liability for the plaintiff'salleged injuries (see e.g. Farragher v City of New York, 26 AD2d 494 [1966], affd21 NY2d 756 [1968]). Moreover, Wagner could not be found liable unless the trier of factfirst determined that the Poritz defendants did not have a reasonable time within which toremedy the alleged defective condition (see generally Sarfowaa v Claflin Apts., 284AD2d 228 [2001]; Edwards v Van Skiver, 256 AD2d 957, 958 [1998]; Brown vO'Connor, 193 AD2d 1088 [1993]; Farragher v City of New York, 26 AD2d 494[1966], affd 21 NY2d 756 [1968]). Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Dickerson and Lott, JJ., concur.


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