| Kopp v Boyango |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07987 [67 AD3d 646] |
| November 4, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Aleksander Kopp et al., Appellants, v Marianne Boyango,Respondent. |
—[*1] Bruce S. Reznick, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Thomas Torto, New York, N.Y., of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiffs appeal, (1) aslimited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (F. Rivera,J.), dated April 29, 2008, as, upon reargument, adhered to a prior determination in an order datedFebruary 8, 2008, denying their motion for summary judgment on the complaint and granting thedefendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and awardingjudgment on the defendant's counterclaim for liquidated damages, and (2) from a judgment of thesame court dated May 7, 2008, which, upon the orders, dismissed the complaint and awarded thedefendant the principal sum of $72,500 on the counterclaim.
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated April 29, 2008 is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, upon reargument, the order datedFebruary 8, 2008 is vacated, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liabilityis granted, the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment is denied, and the order datedApril 29, 2008 is modified accordingly; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiffs.
The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appealtherefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39NY2d 241 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review andhave been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The defendant, as seller, entered into a contract of sale of residential property dated April 15,2005, with the plaintiffs, as purchasers, for a sales price of $725,000. The closing was to takeplace [*2]on or about November 1, 2005.
After entering into the contract of sale, the plaintiffs learned that the property's certificate ofoccupancy described it as a single-family dwelling with an attached garage even though thehome no longer had a garage since it had previously been converted by the defendant or herpredecessor in title into additional living space. The defendant did not possess the necessarypermits or variances for the conversion of the garage into living space.
The plaintiffs, through counsel, requested from the defendant written confirmation from theNew York City Building Department that the conversion of the garage into living space waslegal as it was presently constructed or, in the event that the defendant could not produce thisdocumentation, the plaintiffs demanded a return of their contract down payment. Rather thanproduce the requested documentation, the defendant advised the plaintiffs by letter datedDecember 7, 2005, that since, as of that date, the closing had yet to occur, the defendantdesignated December 20, 2005, at 2:00 p.m., at her attorney's office, as the closing date. Theletter stated that the date "is of the very essence" and that failure to appear and close title on thatdate would be construed as a default on the part of the plaintiffs. In response, counsel for theplaintiffs advised the defendant's attorney by facsimile dated December 12, 2005, that thedefendant's "time of the essence letter" was rejected given the defendant's refusal to remedy theillegal conversion of the garage. The plaintiffs did not attend the December 20, 2005 closing.
In their initial motion for summary judgment against the defendants, the plaintiffsmaintained that the defendant breached the contract by failing to obtain a permit, license, orother authorization from the New York City Department of Buildings for the conversion of theone-car garage to residential use. The plaintiffs specifically argued that the defendant breachedboth paragraph 15 of the rider to the contract, which indicated that the premises was a legalone-family dwelling even though the certificate of occupancy showed that the property was aone-family dwelling with a one-car garage, and paragraph 11 (a) of the contract, which requiredthe defendant to "comply with all notes or notices of violations of law or municipal ordinances,orders or requirements noted in or issued by any governmental department having authority."The plaintiffs also contended that the defendant refused to comply with certain provisions of theAdministrative Code of the City of New York (hereinafter the Administrative Code).
Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant's violation of the Administrative Codevoided the contract, thereby entitling the plaintiffs to summary judgment. With respect to thissecond argument, the plaintiffs maintained that Administrative Code former § 27-147required that no building, construction, alteration, or plumbing work may be commenced until awritten permit had been issued and that Administrative Code former § 27-118.1 prohibitedthe conversion of a property into a dwelling for more than the legally-approved number offamilies. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued, without citing to a specific contract provision: "Thus,since the contract required that the defendant comply with law, and if complying with such lawswas impossible, and/or required action which was not in compliance with the Building Code(since the garage had already been converted to a living space, complete with a wall andwindows where the garage door had been, and the addition of a bathroom, stove and gas lines,etc.) the contract itself was void, and defendant had no entitlement to force plaintiffs to closetitle, and retain their down payment for refusing to do so."
The plaintiffs also contended that Administrative Code former § 26-126.1 detailed thepenalties, including progressive fines, for which a person found to be in violation of theAdministrative Code would be responsible. In reply to the defendant's opposition, the plaintiffsalso referred to paragraph 4 of the contract, which stated that the property was to be transferredsubject to the laws and governmental regulations that affect the premises provided that thepremises did not violate those laws and regulations.
Upon hearing oral argument on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the SupremeCourt denied the motion and granted the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment.Although counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the contract mandated that the premises were tobe compliant with all [*3]New York City ordinances and thepapers submitted to the Supreme Court by the plaintiffs in support of their motion cited tospecific provisions of the Administrative Code the plaintiffs alleged were violated, counsel forthe plaintiffs failed to apprise the Supreme Court of those sections of the Administrative Codeduring oral argument and erroneously stated that the papers "may not have specifically cited it."
The plaintiffs moved for leave to renew and reargue their motion for summary judgment. Intheir motion, which the Supreme Court properly identified as being one for leave to reargueonly, although already having contended in their original motion papers that the contractrequired the defendant to comply with the law and having noted this specific provision in theirreply, the plaintiffs specifically cited to paragraph 4 (a) of the contract in the moving papers.Paragraph 4 (a) of the contract stated that the premises were to be transferred subject to "lawsand governmental regulations that affect the use and maintenance of the premises, provided thatthey are not violated by the buildings and improvements erected on the premises." Leave toreargue was granted by the Supreme Court and upon hearing oral argument, the Supreme Courtadhered to its original determination. Upon reargument, the Supreme Court should have vacatedthe order dated February 8, 2008, and granted the plaintiffs' original motion for summaryjudgment.
With respect to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs established theirprima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the property was not incompliance with the relevant Administrative Code ordinances despite the warranty andrepresentation in the contract that the property was not in violation of any application laws orordinances (see Pamerqua Realty Corp. v Dollar Serv. Corp., 93 AD2d 249 [1983])."The general rule is that 'where a person agrees to purchase real estate, which, at the time, isrestricted by laws or ordinances, he will be deemed to have entered into the contract subject tothe same' . . . An exception exists where the contract contains a provision wherebythe seller warrants and represents that, upon purchase, the property and its structures will not bein violation of any zoning ordinance or regulation" (id. at 251, quoting Lincoln TrustCo. v Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 NY 313, 318 [1920]). In this situation, in the event that thepurchaser determines that the property is not in compliance with the relevant laws or ordinances,the purchaser has the right to demand that the seller rectify the situation with the authorities or toreceive a refund of his or her down payment (id. at 252).
Administrative Code former § 27-147 states that no construction can be done unless awritten permit has been issued by the commissioner. The defendant admits to making alterationswithout the necessary permits and is, therefore, in violation of the Administrative Code andthereby, paragraph 4 (a) of the contract.
The plaintiffs' failure to appear at the December 20, 2005, closing date subsequent to receiptof a "time of the essence" letter does not preclude them from commencing an action to recoverdamages for breach of contract. The defendant, having received sufficient notice of the defect,failed to procure the necessary permits for the conversion. Therefore, the defendant was inbreach pursuant to paragraph 4 (a) at the time of the closing. Due to the defendant's breach, theplaintiffs were not required to tender performance or attend the closing (see Iannelli Bros. vMuscarella, 24 NY2d 779 [1969]; Moray v DBAG, Inc., 305 AD2d 472 [2003];Rhodes v Astro-Pac, Inc., 51 AD2d 656 [1976], affd 41 NY2d 919 [1977] ["apurchaser is not required to make a tender when it is apparent that the seller cannot or will notperform"]). Moreover, while a purchaser must normally first tender performance and demandgood title to place a seller in default, "when the vendor is given notice of the defect prior to thescheduled closing date and does nothing to correct it until after the closing date, the purchaserneed not tender performance as such tender would be meaningless" (Klaiber, LLC v Coon, 48 AD3d856, 857 [2008]).
Here, the plaintiffs' attorney informed the defendant's attorney as early as May 23, 2005, thatthe one-car garage did not appear on the survey. The plaintiffs' attorney reiterated his concerns ina letter to the defendant's attorney dated September 14, 2005, stating that the survey did notreflect the one-car garage cited on the certificate of occupancy. The September 14th letterrequested the defendant to [*4]produce a certificate of occupancymodification to rectify the discrepancy. Both items of correspondence preceded the November 1,2005, closing date and the December 20, 2005, time-of-the-essence closing date. In opposition tothe plaintiffs' showing, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman vCity of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Consequently, the plaintiffs are entitled to thereturn of their down payment. Moreover, in light of the foregoing, the defendant was not entitledto judgment as a matter of law on its counterclaim. Rivera, J.P., Florio, Dickerson and Austin,JJ., concur.[See 19 Misc 3d 1128(A), 2008 NY Slip Op 50934(U).]