| Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 08266 [67 AD3d 1342] |
| November 13, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Ridge Road Fire District, Respondent, v MichaelP. Schiano, as Hearing Officer Designated Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining AgreementBetween Ridge Road Fire District and Ridge Road Professional Firefighters Association IAFF,Local 3794, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Respondent, and Kevin Nowaket al., Appellants. |
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Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Monroe County(Evelyn Frazee, J.), entered June 16, 2008 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. Thejudgment granted the petition and annulled the determination of respondent Michael P. Schiano,as Hearing Officer.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the lawwithout costs, the petition is dismissed and the determination of respondent Michael P. Schiano,as Hearing Officer, is reinstated.
Memorandum: Respondents-appellants (hereafter, respondents) appeal from a judgmentgranting the petition pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul the determination ofrespondent Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer had granted respondent Kevin Nowak benefitspursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a upon finding that petitioner's determinationdenying Nowak benefits was not supported by substantial evidence, and Supreme Court annulledthe Hearing Officer's determination upon concluding that petitioner's denial of benefits wassupported by substantial evidence and that the Hearing Officer's determination was arbitrary andcapricious. That was error.
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into between petitioner andrespondent the Ridge Road Professional Firefighters Association IAFF, Local 3794,International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO (hereafter, Union), an employee who was[*2]denied benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a was entitled to appeal that determination to the Board of Fire Commissioners (Board),which would then appoint a hearing officer chosen from a list of names mutually agreed upon bythe Board and the Union. The CBA provided that "[i]t is the employee ['s] burden to prove [that]the employee is entitled to [General Municipal Law §] 207-a benefits" and that the hearingofficer shall issue a written decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law (cf. Matter of Poughkeepsie ProfessionalFirefighters' Assn., Local 596, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC v New York State Pub. Empl. RelationsBd., 6 NY3d 514, 522 [2006]).
Nowak applied for benefits after he experienced back pain while operating a vehicle, knownas the Quint, in response to a fire alarm on November 7, 2002. It is undisputed that Nowak hadsustained a prior non-work-related injury to his lower back in August 2002 and that, prior to thattime, he had a history of other back injuries, both work related and non-work related. In January2003 petitioner denied Nowak's request for benefits, and a hearing before a hearing officerthereafter was conducted pursuant to the terms of the CBA. The Hearing Officer determined thatrespondents presented substantial evidence that the disability was related to the performance ofNowak's duties. Although Supreme Court transferred the CPLR article 78 proceedingcommenced by petitioner at that time to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g), this Court in turnvacated the order transferring the proceeding and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for adetermination of the merits inasmuch as the Hearing Officer's determination "was not 'made as aresult of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law'. . . [but, r]ather, the determination was the result of a hearing conducted pursuantto the terms of the [CBA]" (Matter ofRidge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano, 41 AD3d 1219, 1220 [2007]). Upon remittal, the courtannulled the determination awarding benefits to Nowak upon concluding that the HearingOfficer had applied an incorrect standard of review and analysis. The Hearing Officer hadanalyzed the issue in terms of whether respondents presented substantial evidence to overridepetitioner's determination, and the court concluded that the Hearing Officer instead should havedetermined whether petitioner's determination was supported by substantial evidence. The courttherefore remitted the matter to the Hearing Officer to apply the correct standard of review.Respondents did not take an appeal from that judgment of Supreme Court, and it therefore is notbefore us on this appeal (see CPLR 5501 [a]).
Upon remittal from Supreme Court, the Hearing Officer issued a second decision,concluding that petitioner's denial of benefits to Nowak was not supported by substantialevidence. Petitioner then commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding and, as previouslynoted, the court granted the petition upon concluding that there was substantial evidence tosupport petitioner's denial of benefits to Nowak and that the Hearing Officer's determination wasarbitrary and capricious (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of HumanRights, 45 NY2d 176, 181 [1978]; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free SchoolDist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222,230-231 [1974]).
We conclude that the court erred in determining that the denial of benefits to Nowak wassupported by substantial evidence and thus that the Hearing Officer's determination to thecontrary was arbitrary and capricious (see generally Pell, 34 NY2d at 230-231). Nowakwas advised that he was denied benefits on the ground that his physician had indicated that hisinjury was related to the non-work-related injury in August 2002, and not a prior work-relatedinjury sustained in November 1999. At the hearing, petitioner presented the testimony and reportof a physician who reviewed Nowak's medical records and agreed that "something about that day[i.e., November 7, 2002] caused a flare up of pain." The physician further concluded, however,that the pain was related to the prior non-work-related injury sustained in August 2002, not theprior work-related injury sustained in November 1999. The court therefore determined that therewas substantial evidence to support the denial of benefits. We disagree, inasmuch as petitioner[*3]also presented the testimony of the battalion chief that, afterreturning from the response to the fire alarm on November 7, 2002, he observed that Nowakappeared to be in pain. After determining that Nowak began experiencing back pain whileoperating the Quint, the battalion chief took Nowak off duty and transported him to the hospital.
It is well established that, "consistent with a liberal reading of section 207-[a], a qualified[employee] need only prove a direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting. . . injury . . . Preexisting non-work-related conditions do not barrecovery under section 207-[a] where [the employee] demonstrates that the job duties were adirect cause of the disability" (Matter of White v County of Cortland, 97 NY2d 336, 340[2002]; see Matter of Theroux vReilly, 1 NY3d 232, 243-244 [2003]). Here, consistent with the requirements of theCBA, respondents, through the testimony of Nowak and his treating physician, demonstrated thatthe job duties performed by Nowak were a direct cause of his disability. Furthermore, aspreviously noted, petitioner presented the testimony of the battalion chief who observed Nowakafter exiting the Quint and determined that Nowak began to experience pain while operating theQuint. We therefore conclude that the denial of benefits, which was based on the determinationthat the disability was solely related to a prior non-work-related injury, is not supported bysubstantial evidence (see generally Pell, 34 NY2d at 230-231), and we thus conclude thatthe court erred in determining that the Hearing Officer's determination to that effect was arbitraryand capricious. We note that, although there was testimony concerning the issue whether the seatin the Quint malfunctioned, that issue is not determinative with respect to whether the denial ofbenefits is supported by substantial evidence, inasmuch as Nowak's operation of the Quint was ajob duty that was a direct cause of Nowak's disability (see White, 97 NY2d at 340).Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Carni, Pine and Gorski, JJ.