| People v Rose |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 08412 [67 AD3d 1447] |
| November 13, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel D.Rose, Appellant. |
—[*1]
Appeal from a judgment of the Steuben County Court (Peter C. Bradstreet, J.), renderedOctober 20, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of driving whileintoxicated, a class E felony.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law,the plea is vacated, that part of the motion seeking to suppress all evidence obtained as the resultof the stop of defendant's vehicle is granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter isremitted to Steuben County Court for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of felonydriving while intoxicated (Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 [3]; § 1193 [1] [c] [i]),defendant contends that County Court erred in determining that the stop of his vehicle waslawful and thus erred in refusing to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of that stop. Weagree.
In support of their contention that the stop was valid, the People mistakenly rely onPeople v Ingle (36 NY2d 413 [1975]), in which the Court of Appeals held that the stopof a vehicle is lawful provided that it is "not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. . . [and is] based upon 'specific and articulable facts' " (id. at 420, quotingTerry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21 [1968]). As defendant correctly contends, however, in thetime since Ingle "the Court of Appeals has made it 'abundantly clear' . . .that 'police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextualtraffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or where there exists at least a reasonable suspicionthat the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about tocommit a crime' . . . or where the police have 'probable cause to believe that thedriver . . . has committed a traffic violation' " (People v Washburn, 309AD2d 1270, 1271 [2003]; see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 348-349 [2001];People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 752-753 [1995], cert denied 516 US 905[1995]; People v White, 27 AD3d1181 [2006]).
Here, the People do not contend that the stop was made pursuant to a traffic check or was[*2]based on the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant hadcommitted a crime. Thus, the stop was valid only if it was supported by probable cause tobelieve that defendant had committed a traffic violation. At the suppression hearing, the policeofficer who stopped defendant's vehicle testified that, as he was traveling behind defendant'svehicle on a divided highway, he observed defendant flash his high beams while there was avehicle approaching from the opposite direction. The officer then stopped defendant's vehiclebased on his belief that defendant had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (3). Theofficer testified that he understood that statute to mean that a driver is not allowed to flash his orher high beams "for particularly no reason at an oncoming vehicle." Section 375 (3) actuallyprovides in relevant part that, "whenever a vehicle approaching from ahead is within [500] feet. . . , the headlamps, if of the multiple beam type . . . shall be operatedso that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of the approaching vehicle. . . ." The mere flashing of lights, alone, does not constitute a violation of thestatute (see People v Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 397 [1960]; People v Hines, 155AD2d 722, 724 [1989], lv denied 76 NY2d 736 [1990]; People v Lauber, 162Misc 2d 19, 20 [1994]).
The People presented no testimony at the hearing concerning the distance betweendefendant's vehicle and the oncoming vehicle, and there was no evidence that defendant'sflashing of the high beams interfered in any way with the driver of the approaching vehicle.Indeed, because the officer mistakenly believed that flashing of the high beams for no particularreason was unlawful irrespective of the distance between vehicles, the officer did not concernhimself with the distance of the approaching vehicle. Thus, the stop of defendant's vehicle wasbased on a mistake of law. "Where the officer's belief is based on an erroneous interpretation oflaw, the stop is illegal at the outset and any further actions by the police as a direct result of thestop are illegal" (Matter of Byer v Jackson, 241 AD2d 943, 944-945 [1997]; see People v Smith, 1 AD3d 965[2003]; see also People v Gonzalez, 88 NY2d 289, 295 [1996]).
We therefore reverse the judgment, vacate defendant's guilty plea, grant that part of theomnibus motion seeking to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of the stop of defendant'svehicle, dismiss the indictment, and remit the matter to County Court for proceedings pursuant toCPL 470.45. Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Martoche, Smith, Carni and Pine, JJ.