| Radoncic v Independence Garden Owners Corp. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 08798 [67 AD3d 981] |
| November 24, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Fadil Radoncic et al., Appellants, v Independence GardenOwners Corp., Respondent. |
—[*1] James R. Pieret, Garden City, N.Y. (Thomas P. Williams of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an orderof the Supreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated July 10, 2008, which granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff Fadil Radoncic (hereinafter Fadil) was employed by nonparty CPMT, abuilding management company that had a contract to manage the apartment complex owned bythe defendant. Fadil was injured when he fell from a ladder as he was cutting a tree branch thathad fallen against some utility lines. Fadil and his wife, Zejreme Radoncic (hereinafter togetherthe plaintiffs), commenced this action against the defendant, asserting causes of action soundingin common-law negligence, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and§ 241 (6), and asserting a derivative cause of action to recover damages for loss ofconsortium and services. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. We affirm.
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgmentdismissing the causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6), astree cutting is not one of the activities covered by those statutory provisions (see Morales v Westchester Stone Co., Inc.,63 AD3d 805 [2009]; Rivera vSantos, 35 AD3d 700, 701-702 [2006]; Burr v Short, 285 AD2d 576 [2001];DeGennaro v Long Is. R.R., 258 AD2d 496 [1999]). Moreover, the defendantestablished, prima facie, that the tree cutting constituted "routine maintenance outside of aconstruction or renovation context" (Morales v Westchester Stone Co., Inc., 63 AD3d at806; see Riccio v NHT Owners, LLC,51 AD3d 897, 899 [2008]; Diaz v Applied Digital Data Sys., 300 AD2d 533,535 [2002]), and the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response (seeZuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; Morales v WestchesterStone Co. Inc., 63 AD3d at 806).
The Supreme Court also properly granted those branches of the defendant's motion whichwere for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 200and based on [*2]common-law negligence. Labor Law §200 "is a codification of the common-law duty of a landowner to provide workers with areasonably safe place to work" (Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 294 [1992]; see Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d121, 127-128 [2008]). Where, as here, "a claim arises out of alleged defects or dangers inthe methods or materials of the work, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot behad under Labor Law § 200 unless it is shown that the party to be charged had theauthority to supervise or control the performance of the work" (Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61[2008]). The defendant met its prima facie burden in this regard by establishing that, at most, thepresident of its board of directors exercised mere general supervisory authority over Fadil, whichis insufficient to impose liability (id.;Natale v City of New York, 33 AD3d 772, 773 [2006]). In response, the plaintiffs failedto raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 560).
The plaintiffs' remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., Florio, Balkin andLeventhal, JJ., concur.