| Matter of Summer D. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 08818 [67 AD3d 1008] |
| November 24, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Summer D., Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Barry P. Schwartz and JulieSteiner of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals arefrom (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County (Hunt, J.), dated February 2,2009, which, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed byan adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in thefourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and menacing in thethird degree, and (2) an order of disposition of the same court dated March 17, 2009, which, upon thefact-finding order, adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probationfor a period of 18 months with the condition, among others, that she complete 180 hours ofcommunity service.
Ordered that the appeal from the fact-finding order is dismissed, without costs ordisbursements, as that order was superseded by the order of disposition; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matterof David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Davonte B., 44 AD3d 763 [2007]; Matter of Charles S., 41 AD3d484, 485 [2007]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonabledoubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constitutedthe crimes of robbery in the second degree (see Penal Law § 160.10 [1]; Matter of Kenyetta F., 49 AD3d540, 541 [2008]; Matter of LaquanH., 29 AD3d 582, 582-583 [2006]), grand larceny in the fourth degree (seePenal Law § 155.30 [5]; Matterof Michael D., 35 AD3d 227, 228 [2006]; Matter of Nasheem P., 23 AD3d 662 [2005]), criminal possessionof stolen property in the fifth degree (see Penal Law § 165.40; Matter of Jabari W., 18 AD3d 767[2005]), and menacing in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.15; Matter of John F., 12 AD3d 509[2004]).
Resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the finder of fact,which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference onappeal (see Matter of Charles S., 41AD3d 484 [2007]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court'sdetermination was not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act §342.2 [2]; cf. People v Romero, 7NY3d 633 [2006]).[*2]
The Family Court has broad discretion in fashioningorders of disposition (see Family Ct Act § 141; Matter of Ariell C., 54 AD3d 1034 [2008]; Matter of Donnell W., 36 AD3d926 [2007]). Here, in determining the least restrictive available alternative consistent withthe appellant's best interests and the need for the protection of the community (seeFamily Ct Act § 352.2 [2] [a]; Matter of Bruce B., 54 AD3d 1031 [2008]), the court providentlyexercised its discretion in placing the appellant on probation rather than directing anadjournment in contemplation of dismissal as requested by the appellant (see Family CtAct § 353.2) and directing that the appellant complete community service (seeFamily Ct Act § 353.3 [8]). The imposition of a period of probation was appropriate inlight of the seriousness of the appellant's crimes and the appellant's school records, whichindicated that she had been suspended for possessing alcohol.
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit. Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Hall and Lott,JJ., concur.