People v Ball
2009 NY Slip Op 08891 [68 AD3d 1148]
December 3, 2009
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 10, 2010


The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stephen J.Ball, Appellant.

[*1]LaVonda S. Collins, Latham, for appellant. Gerald F. Mollen, District Attorney,Binghamton (Torrance L. Schmitz of counsel), for respondent.

Lahtinen, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Smith, J.),rendered May 14, 2008, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary inthe third degree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the third degree in September 2007. Hewas also facing a federal prison term and, at his request, County Court agreed to delaysentencing until such had been served. A detainer warrant was then issued to ensure defendant'sreturn to New York. Defendant thereafter requested that he be returned to County Court forsentencing, and he was sentenced in May 2008 as a second felony offender to a prison term of 2to 4 years. Defendant appeals and we affirm.

Initially, defendant claims that the delay in sentencing violated the Interstate Agreement onDetainers Act (see 18 USC Appendix 2; CPL 580.20), which provides that a defendantimprisoned elsewhere must be returned to New York and brought to trial within 180 days of hisor her request for a final disposition of "any untried indictment, information, or complaint on thebasis of which a detainer has been lodged" (18 USC Appendix 2, § 2, art III [a]; CPL580.20, art III [a]). Defendant was not untried given his guilty plea, however, and CPL 580.20 isinapplicable "where guilt has been established and defendant is awaiting sentencing" (Peoplev Nosek, 236 AD2d 892, 893 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 877 [1997]; see Peoplev Peterson, 264 [*2]AD2d 574, 576 [1999], lv denied94 NY2d 865 [1999], cert denied 531 US 831 [2000]; Matter of Epps v Hunt,167 AD2d 789, 790 [1990]).

Nor was the delay in sentencing otherwise unreasonable. "Although CPL 380.30 (1) requiresthat a sentence be pronounced upon a defendant without unreasonable delay, a delay will beexcused where it is attributable to legal proceedings or conduct of the defendant whichaccentuates the delay" (People vArroyo, 22 AD3d 881, 882 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 773 [2006] [citationomitted]; see People v Campbell, 97 NY2d 532, 534 [2002]). County Court was preparedto sentence defendant when he entered his guilty plea, but defendant requested a delay insentencing because he "wanted to serve the federal sentence first." Although defendant laterasked to be sentenced in November 2007, such was based upon his incorrect belief that he wouldbe released in the near future, and there is no question that he was sentenced less than a monthafter his actual release from federal custody. In short, we view any delay in sentencing, to theextent it was not entirely created by defendant's actions, as a reasonable one.

Cardona, P.J., Spain, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.


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