| Enos v Werlatone, Inc. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 08992 [68 AD3d 712] |
| December 1, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Adam Enos, Appellant, v Werlatone, Inc., et al.,Defendants, and Glenn Werlau et al., Respondents. |
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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by hisbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (O'Rourke, J.), datedAugust 17, 2007, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Glenn Werlau andChristel Werlau which was for leave to reargue that branch of their motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, which had beendetermined in an order dated May 2, 2007, and, upon reargument, in effect, vacated thedetermination in the order dated May 2, 2007, denying that branch of their motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and thereupongranted that branch of the motion.
Ordered that the order dated August 17, 2007 is affirmed insofar as appealed from, withcosts.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly granted reargument and,upon reargument, properly granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Glenn Werlauand Christel Werlau which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against them, which alleged causes of action sounding in common-law negligence andviolations of Labor Law § 200. These defendants established their prima facie entitlementto judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325[1986]). The evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff's accident allegedly arose from the meansand methods of the work performed, that the work was directed and controlled exclusively by thedefendant Michael Werlau, and that the defendants Glenn Werlau and Christel Werlau did nothave authority to exercise any supervisory control over the work, that is, they did not "bear[ ] theresponsibility for the manner in which the work [was] performed" (Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 62[2008]; see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993];Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 295 [1992]; Kwang Ho Kim v D & W Shin RealtyCorp., 47 AD3d 616, 620 [2008]; Ragone v Spring Scaffolding, Inc., 46 AD3d 652, 655 [2007]; Peay v New York City School Constr.Auth., 35 AD3d 566, 567 [2006]; Locicero v Princeton Restoration, Inc., 25 AD3d 664, 666 [2006]).In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triableissue of fact, since a mere showing that Glenn Werlau or Christel Werlau had generalsupervisory [*2]authority over the project is not sufficient for thispurpose (see Enriquez v B & D Dev.,Inc., 63 AD3d 780, 781 [2009]; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 62; Mas vKohen, 283 AD2d 616 [2001]; Braun v Fischbach & Moore, 280 AD2d 506 [2001];Loiacono v Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 270 AD2d 464, 465 [2000]). Rivera, J.P.,Dickerson, Hall and Lott, JJ., concur.