| Lampkin v Chan |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09002 [68 AD3d 727] |
| December 1, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Barbara Lampkin, Appellant, v Tin L. Chan et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Stephen B. Prystowsky of counsel),for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Satterfield, J.), entered June 22, 2009, which denied hermotion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.
A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence withrespect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on "that operator to rebut theinference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision" (Klopchin v Masri, 45 AD3d 737,737 [2007]; see Niyazov vBradford, 13 AD3d 501, 501-502 [2004]; Russ v Investech Sec., 6 AD3d 602 [2004]). Here, the plaintiffmade a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment by submitting evidence thatshe was stopped in traffic when her vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants' vehicle,causing her vehicle to collide with the vehicle in front of her (see Piltser v Donna Lee Mgt. Corp., 29 AD3d 973, 974 [2006];Espinoza v Diaz, 280 AD2d 639 [2001]). In opposition, the defendants failed to comeforward with sufficient evidence to rebut the inference of negligence and to raise a triable issueof fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980]; Gomez v Sammy's Transp., Inc., 19AD3d 544 [2005]; Rainford v SungS. Han, 18 AD3d 638, 639 [2005]). The defendants interposed only an affirmation oftheir attorney who lacked knowledge of the facts (see Gomez v Sammy's Transp., Inc., 19 AD3d 544 [2005]). Thedefendants' claim that the plaintiff made a sudden stop in heavy traffic, standing alone, under thecircumstances of this case, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence (see Lundy v Llatin, 51 AD3d 877,877-878 [2008]; Campbell v City ofYonkers, 37 AD3d 750, 751 [2007]; Emil Norsic & Son, Inc. v L.P. Transp., Inc., 30 AD3d 368,368-369 [2006]; Neidereger vMisuraca, 27 AD3d 537, 538 [2006]; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392 [1996]).
Furthermore, in view of the fact that the defendants had personal knowledge of the relevantfacts underlying the accident, their purported need to conduct discovery did not warrant denial ofthe [*2]motion (see Emil Norsic & Son, Inc. v L.P. Transp.,Inc., 30 AD3d at 369; Rainford vSung S. Han, 18 AD3d 638, 639 [2005]; Niyazov v Bradford, 13 AD3d at 502).
Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability shouldhave been granted. Skelos, J.P., Florio, Balkin, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.