| Johnson v Nisbet |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09137 [68 AD3d 1333] |
| December 10, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Marc A. Johnson et al., Appellants, v Philip Nisbet,Respondent. |
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Garry, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Williams, J.), entered April 15, 2009in Saratoga County, which, among other things, granted defendant's cross motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiffs own two parcels of land in the Town of Saratoga, Saratoga County, one borderingthe eastern shore of Saratoga Lake and the other in the immediate vicinity, but on the other sideof State Route 9P. Defendant also owns a lakefront parcel and a second lot across the road,purchased in August 2005 from Russell Fritz and Patricia Fritz. A third parcel of lakefront land(hereinafter the middle parcel) separates the parties' lakefront lots. This middle parcel waspreviously owned by Saratoga County, and was purchased by plaintiffs in March 2007.
Prior to transferring their two lots to defendant, the Fritzes were involved in litigation withplaintiffs pertaining to an easement held by plaintiffs over their lakefront parcel. They settledthat litigation by entering into several settlement documents, including a "Stipulation ofSettlement" filed in the Saratoga County Clerk's office in January 2005. The stipulationprovided, among other things, that plaintiffs would renounce the easement and that the Fritzeswould not bid on the middle parcel when it was sold at the anticipated County auction, orotherwise interfere with plaintiffs' efforts to obtain title to [*2]it.In compliance with this stipulation, plaintiffs and the Fritzes executed an "Agreement to Revisean Easement" filed in July 2005. Defendant acquired his deed from the Fritzes just over onemonth later. A title report furnished to defendant as part of his title insurance set forth anexception from coverage for the stipulation.
The middle parcel was sold at the County auction in March 2007. A number of biddersinitially competed, but when the price reached $40,000, all dropped out except for arepresentative of plaintiffs and an alleged representative of defendant.[FN*]These two continued bidding until plaintiffs' representative entered a final successful bid of$95,000.
Plaintiffs commenced this action asserting three causes of action, including breach ofcontract, and alleging that defendant breached the stipulation by bidding on the middle parceland driving up its price beyond the amount that plaintiffs assert they would otherwise have paid.Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract cause of action, and defendantcross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. Supreme Courtdenied plaintiffs' motion, granted defendant's cross motion, and dismissed the complaint.Plaintiffs now appeal.
Supreme Court determined that the stipulation's prohibition against bidding on the middleparcel was not binding upon defendant because it violated the rule against perpetuities(see EPTL 9-1.1). We affirm, but on different grounds. In the court's view, theprohibition against bidding on the middle parcel was a "real" covenant that ran with the land andwas not personal to the Fritzes because the stipulation explicitly provides that its obligations "arepermanent and shall also be binding upon the parties' heirs, successors and assigns, and shall runwith the land forever." The court concluded that under this provision, the prohibition was notlimited in duration by the lifespans of the Fritzes and, therefore, violated the prohibition againstremote vesting in the rule against perpetuities (see EPTL 9-1.1 [b]). We find, however,that the rule against perpetuities is inapplicable.
"The rule against perpetuities embodies the principle that 'it is socially undesirable forproperty to be inalienable for an unreasonable period of time' " (Matter of Kreuzer, 243AD2d 207, 209 [1998], quoting Symphony Space v Pergola Props., 88 NY2d 466, 475[1996]). Codified in EPTL 9-1.1, the rule against perpetuities controls the remote vesting offuture interests and the suspension of the power of alienation and, in so doing, "strive[s] to strikea balance between society's interest in the free alienability of property and the rights of owners todirect future transfers" (Wildenstein & Co. v Wallis, 79 NY2d 641, 648 [1992]). Theseconcerns are not presented here. Unlike options to purchase or rights of first refusal, which havebeen held to be subject to the rule against perpetuities (see Morrison v Piper, 77 NY2d165, 169 [1990]; Buffalo Seminary v McCarthy, 58 NY2d 867 [1983], affg forreasons stated below 86 AD2d 435 [1982]; Adler v Simpson, 203 AD2d 691, 693[1994]), the stipulation's prohibition against bidding on the middle parcel neither created aninterest in property on anyone's part that could vest remotely or at any time, nor did it suspend orrestrain any landowner's power of alienation (see EPTL 9-1.1 [a] [1]). Saratoga Countywas not a party to the stipulation and its power to alienate the middle parcel was unaffected bythe agreement of the parties, neither of whom [*3]had anyownership interest in the middle parcel at the time of the stipulation. Therefore, the rule againstperpetuities does not apply.
Standing alone, however, the language of the stipulation does not provide a sufficient basisfor the conclusion that the restriction against bidding ran with the land. An intention for anagreement to bind heirs and successors is not enough; a party seeking to establish that a covenantruns with the land must show that "(1) the grantor and grantee intended the covenant to run withthe land, (2) there is privity of estate between the parties to the current dispute, and (3) thecovenant touches and concerns the land" (Clarke v Caldwell, 132 AD2d 171, 174 [1987];see Neponsit Prop. Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY 248, 255[1938]). The prohibition against bidding on the middle parcel does not meet this test because itdoes not touch and concern the land with which it purports to run. In determining whether acovenant touches and concerns the land, the Court of Appeals has stated that the inquiry"depend[s] upon the effect of the covenant on the legal rights which otherwise would flow fromownership of land and which are connected with the land. The problem then is: [d]oes thecovenant in purpose and effect substantially alter these rights?" (Neponsit Prop.Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY at 258). A covenant touches andconcerns the land when it "directly affects the uses to which the land may be put andsubstantially affects its value" (Orange & Rockland Util. v Philwold Estates, 52 NY2d253, 263 [1981]) and when it " 'compel[s] the covenanter to submit to some restriction on the use of his [or her] property' "(Newcomb v Congdon, 160 AD2d 1192, 1194 [1990], quoting Neponsit Prop.Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY at 256 [emphasis omitted]). Thecovenant at issue here does not meet these tests because its effect is unrelated to the land withwhich it purports to run. A bidder's right to purchase a parcel of land at a county auction existswithout regard to ownership of any other land and is not a right which "flow[s] from ownershipof land and which [is] connected with the land" (Neponsit Prop. Owners' Assn. v EmigrantIndus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY at 258). The Fritzes' promise affected their right to seekownership of the middle parcel, but it did not affect or restrict in any way their use of theproperty that they owned at the time of the stipulation (and later transferred to defendant). Thepromise was "a personal act disconnected with the use of the [Fritzes'] land" (Newcomb vCongdon, 160 AD2d at 1194). It did not touch or concern their land, and therefore did notrun with that land.
No other basis exists on which defendant may be found to be bound by the stipulationrelative to the bidding restriction. Plaintiffs argue that he had constructive notice of thestipulation because it was recorded (see Real Property Law § 291; AndyAssoc. v Bankers Trust Co., 49 NY2d 13, 20 [1979]), as well as actual notice based on theexception from coverage in his title insurance. Defendant contends that he was not personallyaware of the stipulation before this lawsuit was filed but concedes that he is chargeable withnotice. However, mere notice does not suffice. "[T]he assignee of rights under a bilateralcontract is not obligated to perform the duties under the contract unless he [or she] expresslyassumes to do so" (Todd v Krolick, 96 AD2d 695, 695 [1983], affd 62 NY2d 836[1984]; see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 402 [1957]). Noclaim has been made that defendant expressly assumed any obligation under the stipulation. Hewas not, therefore, bound by it, and Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. Thisdetermination makes it unnecessary to reach the parties' remaining arguments.
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Kane and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.
Footnote *: It is disputed whether therepresentative appeared on behalf of defendant as an individual and/or his wife, or for Orbit RealEstate, LLC, an entity owned in full in equal shares by defendant and his wife.