Varshavskaya v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
2009 NY Slip Op 09215 [68 AD3d 855]
December 8, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 10, 2010


Nataliya Varshavskaya et al., Appellants,
v
MetropolitanLife Insurance Company, Respondent.

—[*1]Daniel S. Perlman, New York, N.Y., for appellants.

Matthew A. Michaels, New York, N.Y. (Michael J. Eng and Tomasita Sherer of counsel),for respondent.

In an action to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy, the plaintiffs appeal from ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated December 24, 2008, which,upon an order of the same court dated December 2, 2008, granting the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint and denying their cross motion for summaryjudgment on the complaint, is in favor of the defendant and against them dismissing thecomplaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

"[T]o establish its right to rescind an insurance policy, an insurer must demonstrate that theinsured made a material misrepresentation. A misrepresentation is material if the insurer wouldnot have issued the policy had it known the facts misrepresented" (Zilkha v Mutual Life Ins.Co. of N.Y., 287 AD2d 713, 714 [2001]; see Schirmer v Penkert, 41 AD3d 688, 690 [2007]; Insurance Law§ 3105 [b]). "To establish materiality as a matter of law, the insurer must presentdocumentation concerning its underwriting practices, such as underwriting manuals, bulletins, orrules pertaining to similar risks, that show that it would not have issued the same policy if thecorrect information had been disclosed in the application" (Schirmer v Penkert, 41 AD3dat 690-691; see Parmar v Hermitage Ins.Co., 21 AD3d 538, 540 [2005]; Curanovic v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,307 AD2d 435, 437 [2003]).

Here, the defendant insurer demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matterof law. The defendant established that the decedent's misrepresentation was material as a matterof law by submitting an affidavit of its associate chief underwriter and relevant portions of itsunderwriting manual which showed that the defendant would not have issued the same policy ifthe correct information pertaining to his income had been disclosed in the application (see Roudneva v Bankers Life Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 35 AD3d 580, 581 [2006]; Gorra v New York Life Ins. Co., 276 AD2d469, 470 [2000]; Insurance Law § 3105 [c]; cf. Schirmer v Penkert, 41 AD3d at690-691; Parmar v Hermitage Ins. Co., 21 AD3d at 540). In response, the plaintiffsfailed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,562 [1980]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion forsummary [*2]judgment dismissing the complaint and denied theplaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Miller, Dickersonand Roman, JJ., concur.


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