Matter of Miney v Donovan
2009 NY Slip Op 09232 [68 AD3d 876]
December 8, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 10, 2010


In the Matter of Elizabeth Miney, Respondent,
v
ShaunDonovan, Appellant, et al., Respondent.

—[*1]Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo andKaren M. Griffin of counsel), for appellant.

Daniel M. Bauso, Garden City, N.Y., for petitioner-respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York CityDepartment of Housing Preservation and Development dated November 7, 2007, ShaunDonovan, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation andDevelopment, appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J.),dated July 8, 2008, which, after a hearing, granted the petition and directed the New York CityDepartment of Housing Preservation and Development to grant the petitioner's application forsuccession rights to the subject apartment.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the determination is confirmed,the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.

In September 2001 the petitioner moved into her mother's apartment, located in aMitchell-Lama housing development (see Private Housing Finance Law § 10et seq. [hereinafter the Mitchell-Lama Law]) in Queens known as the Big Six Towers,Inc. (hereinafter the Big Six), and allegedly has lived there continuously since then. Thepetitioner's mother died in December 2003.

In July 2007 the petitioner received a letter from the Big Six denying her application forsuccession rights because she did not prove that she co-occupied the subject apartment with hermother, the tenant of record, for two years prior to her mother's death. The petitioner was notlisted on any income affidavit for the apartment until a 2003 income affidavit, which was filed in2004. The petitioner appealed the denial of her application for succession rights to the New YorkCity Department of Housing Preservation and Development (hereinafter HPD). HPD upheld thedenial, finding that the petitioner did not meet the eligibility requirements, as she did not appearon the income affidavits for the two years prior to her mother's death in December 2003. Thepetitioner then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review HPD'sdetermination. The Supreme Court found that HPD's determination was arbitrary and capricious,and directed HPD to grant her application for succession rights to the apartment.

The regulations implementing the Mitchell-Lama Law which relate to succession rights wereamended as of February 1, 2003 (see 28 RCNY 3-02 [p]). Prior to the amendment, if afamily member [*2]did not appear on the income affidavits forthe subject apartment for the two years prior to the tenant's vacatur of the apartment, a rebuttablepresumption was created that the family member did not reside in the apartment during those twoyears. The amendment eliminated this rebuttable presumption, so that an occupant who does notappear on the relevant income affidavits may not receive succession rights to the apartment, anddoes not have the opportunity to present a rebuttal (id).

The relevant residency period here is from December 30, 2001, to December 30, 2003, thedate of the death of the petitioner's mother. There is no dispute that the petitioner did not appearon the income affidavit for the year 2002, which was filed in April 2003, after the newregulations took effect. As of February 1, 2003, the petitioner was on notice that she needed tobe listed on the income affidavits in order to be eligible for succession rights. Since she was notlisted on the income affidavits for the two years preceding her mother's death, she is ineligiblefor succession rights. Thus, HPD's determination was not arbitrary and capricious, and thepetition should have been denied.

The petitioner's argument regarding tenancy by estoppel is without merit. Generally,estoppel cannot be invoked against a governmental agency to prevent it from discharging itsstatutory duties (see Matter of Schorr vNew York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 10 NY3d 776, 779 [2008]). Covello,J.P., Santucci, Chambers and Hall, JJ., concur.


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