| Eusebio v Yannetti |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09423 [68 AD3d 919] |
| December 15, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Gloria Eusebio, Appellant, v Veronica Yannetti,Respondent. |
—[*1] Kaplan & McCarthy, East Elmhurst, N.Y. (Justin M. Delaire of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kerins, J.), dated September 29, 2008, which granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that theplaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain aserious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subjectaccident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy vEyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition to the defendant's motion, the plaintiffprincipally relied on the affidavit of her treating chiropractor Dr. Nicholas Martin. In thataffidavit, Dr. Martin opined, based upon his contemporaneous and most recent examinations ofthe plaintiff and his review of the plaintiff's affirmed magnetic resonance imaging reports of hercervical and lumbar regions, which revealed, inter alia, a herniated disc at C4-5 and a disc bulgeat C5-6, that the plaintiff's cervical and lumbar injuries and observed range-of-motion limitationswere significant and permanent, and causally related to the subject accident. Thus, the plaintiffraised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained serious injury to her cervical and/orlumbar spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and/or significant limitation ofuse categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (seeSanevich v Lyubomir, 66 AD3d 665 [2009]; Azor v Torado, 59 AD3d 367, 368[2009]; Williams v Clark, 54 AD3d 942, 943 [2008]; Casey v Mas Transp., Inc.,48 AD3d 610, 611 [2008]; Green v Nara Car & Limo, Inc., 42 AD3d 430, 431 [2007];Francovig v Senekis Cab Corp., 41 AD3d 643, 644-645 [2007]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the plaintiff's cessation of treatment for her injurieswas adequately explained in Dr. Martin's affidavit. Dr. Martin explained that the plaintiffstopped treatment in November 2006 because she had reached her maximum medicalimprovement [*2]and any further treatment would have merelybeen palliative in nature (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 577 [2005]). Dillon, J.P.,Miller, Eng, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.