| Boadnaraine v City of New York |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09601 [68 AD3d 1032] |
| December 22, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Parbatie Boadnaraine, Respondent, v City of New York etal., Defendants, and White Glove Placement, Inc., Appellant. |
—[*1] Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, Newburgh, N.Y. (Finkelstein & Partners [James W. ShuttleworthIII], of counsel), for respondent.
In a consolidated action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligent hiring, the defendantWhite Glove Placement, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), entered December 18, 2008, as denied that branchof its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action assertedagainst it alleging negligent hiring.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and thatbranch of the appellant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause ofaction asserted against it alleging negligent hiring is granted.
On September 6, 2005 the plaintiff Parbatie Boadnaraine, while a patient at the defendantQueens Hospital Center, allegedly was sexually assaulted by the defendant Jacob Onanuga. Atthe time, Onanuga was a New York State-licensed, registered nurse, employed by the appellantWhite Glove Placement, Inc. (hereinafter White Glove), and was assigned by White Glove towork at the defendant Queens Hospital Center.
The Supreme Court denied that branch of White Glove's motion which was for summaryjudgment dismissing the first cause of action asserted against it, alleging negligent hiring,holding that White Glove failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw. We reverse.
White Glove established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law bydemonstrating that it "acted with reasonable care in hiring, retaining and supervising theemployee" (Judith M. v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 NY2d 932, 933-934 [1999]; seeMason v Ben Roy Das, Inc., 34 AD3d 768 [2006]; Doe v Whitney, 8 AD3d 610, 612[2004]). Contrary to the Supreme Court's holding, White glove satisfied its prima facie burdenby submitting the affidavit of Carol Abraham, its employment manager, in which she averredthat, at the time Onanuga was hired, he was a New York State-licensed, registered nurse, withtwo favorable references from supervisors from other facilities [*2]where he had worked as a nurse.
In opposition to White Glove's prima facie showing, Boadnaraine failed to raise a triableissue of fact as to whether Onanuga was not a New York State-licensed, registered nurse in goodstanding when he was hired, or that White Glove knew or should have known of any propensityon his part to engage in the conduct resulting in the injury (see Doe v Whitney, 8 AD3dat 612; Mataxas v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 211 AD2d 762, 763 [1995]). A duty toinvestigate further into Onanuga's background, or to "institute specific procedures for hiringemployees," may be imposed upon White Glove only if it knew "facts that would lead areasonably prudent person to investigate the prospective employee" (Kenneth R. v RomanCatholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 AD2d 159, 163 [1997], cert denied 522 US 967[1997]; see Mason v Ben Roy Das, Inc., 34 AD3d at 768). Here, no such facts wereshown to exist.
Although disclosure was incomplete when White Glove moved for summary judgment, themotion was not premature because Boadnaraine failed to demonstrate that further discoverymight lead to relevant evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Dempaire v Cityof New York, 61 AD3d 816, 817 [2009]; Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759,760 [2006]; David B. v Millar, 2 AD3d 763 [2003]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of White Glove's motionwhich was for summary judgment to dismissing the first cause of action asserted against it,alleging negligent hiring. Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.