| Joson v G & S Realty 1, LLC |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09620 [68 AD3d 1061] |
| December 22, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Adelina Joson et al., Respondents, v G & S Realty 1, LLC,et al., Respondents, and TPD Construction Corp., Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cervini, Jackson Heights, N.Y. (Robin Mary Heaney of counsel), forplaintiffs-respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant TPD ConstructionCorp. appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, KingsCounty (Hurkin-Torres, J.), dated January 22, 2009, as denied its motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Generally, unless a trial court specifies otherwise, a party has 120 days after the filing of anote of issue to move for summary judgment, after which it may do so only with "leave of courton good cause shown" (CPLR 3212 [a]). This "requires a showing of good cause for the delay inmaking the motion—a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather thansimply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy" (Brill v City of NewYork, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]). A trial court has discretion in determining whether toconsider a motion for summary judgment made more than 120 days after the filing of a note ofissue (see CPLR 3212 [a]; Gonzalez v 98 Mag Leasing Corp., 95 NY2d 124, 129[2000]).
Here, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion of thedefendant TPD Construction Corp. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all crossclaims insofar as asserted against it because it failed to timely file its motion (see CPLR3212 [a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d at 652; Gonzalez v 98 Mag LeasingCorp., 95 NY2d at 129). Covello, J.P., Santucci, Chambers and Hall, JJ., concur.