| People v Darkel C. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09671 [68 AD3d 1129] |
| December 22, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Darkel C., Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Ellen C.Abbot, and Daniel Bresnahan of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Mullin, J.),rendered February 7, 2007, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty,and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, byvacating the sentence imposed thereon; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matteris remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for resentencing.
Following the defendant's plea of guilty, but before his sentencing, the defendant wasassigned new counsel. At the sentencing proceeding, a question was raised as to whether thedefendant should receive an enhanced sentence based upon his alleged violation of a condition ofhis plea agreement. The defendant's new counsel requested an adjournment so that he couldobtain a copy of the plea minutes, since he had not represented the defendant at the plea. TheSupreme Court denied the application and thereafter determined that the defendant had violateda condition of the plea agreement. Accordingly, the court imposed an enhanced sentence,apparently without defense counsel having received an opportunity to review the plea minutes.We vacate the sentence and remit for resentencing.
While the decision of whether to grant or deny an adjournment is ordinarily committed to thesound discretion of the court to which the application for the adjournment is made (seePeople v Singleton, 41 NY2d 402, 405 [1977]), the Supreme Court improvidently exercisedthat discretion in this case by denying the requested adjournment (see generally People vSpears, 64 NY2d 698, 700 [1984]). Under the circumstances presented, the defendant'scounsel should have been afforded an opportunity to familiarize himself with the details of theplea agreement prior to the imposition of sentence. Accordingly, resentencing is warranted.
In view of the foregoing, we do not reach the parties' remaining contentions. Mastro, J.P.,Florio, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.