| People v Diaz |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09693 [68 AD3d 642] |
| December 29, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David Diaz, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Malancha Chanda of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Lewis Bart Stone, J.), rendered February 8,2006, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance inthe second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony drug offender, to a term of sevenyears, affirmed.
Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seconddegree after 253 packets of crack cocaine worth $3,000 were found in a hidden compartment of aminivan that was driven, but not owned, by defendant. The People prosecuted on a theory ofconstructive possession. We find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish beyond areasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed crack cocaine and that thecrack cocaine he possessed weighed at least four ounces (see Penal Law § 220.18[1]).
Moreover, we find the court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress on grounds ofan illegal search. Testimony at the suppression hearing established that on July 21, 2005, OfficerAngel Torres of the Manhattan Gang Squad spotted a double-parked minivan, with its enginerunning, at the corner of West 152nd Street and Broadway, a known drug-prone area. Torresobserved defendant exit the vehicle from the driver's seat to scrape off a Sanitation Departmentsticker from the vehicle's window with a razor blade. Because the vehicle was illegallydouble-parked in a drug-prone area, Torres approached defendant. When asked why he wasdouble-parked, defendant replied that he was waiting for a friend who was inside the grocerystore across the street. When Torres asked defendant to move the vehicle, defendant replied thathis friend would return from the store in five minutes. Torres testified that defendant had a calmdemeanor.
Nevertheless, when the friend failed to return, Torres became suspicious, and believing thatdrug activity was taking place, asked defendant to show him paperwork for the vehicle. Whendefendant opened the door to reach into the minivan, Torres, who was standing behinddefendant, looked inside the vehicle with a flashlight held on defendant's hands in order toensure his safety. In doing so, Torres leaned partially into the vehicle.
Torres then observed two $100 bills near the center console of the vehicle and also a [*2]small one-inch bag. Although the bag was empty, there appeared tobe green particles in the bag which Torres believed to be marijuana. Torres did not smell anymarijuana odor coming from the car but based on his observation, he asked defendant to step outof the vehicle.
After confirming that the small bag had contained marijuana, Torres searched the glovecompartment and recovered nine new crack pipes, prescription drugs and registration papers.The prescription drugs were not in defendant's name. Moreover, the minivan was registered to aperson of a different name but it had not been reported stolen.
At that point, Torres searched the vehicle, and by tugging on the right passenger air bagcompartment, he noticed velcro material and determined there was a possibility of concealeditems. Upon further searching, Torres discovered 253 bags of crack cocaine hidden in thecompartment, whereupon he arrested defendant. After the arrest, defendant changed his story andtold Torres that he had borrowed the minivan to buy "weed" and that he had nothing else to say.Torres further testified that he established that defendant lived just two blocks away from wherehe had double-parked the minivan.
On August 31, 2005, a New York County grand jury handed up an indictment againstdefendant charging him with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second andthird degrees. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the minivan.
On October 31, 2005, the trial court held a suppression hearing, at the conclusion of whichthe court denied defendant's motion, finding that Torres was credible and acted reasonably whenhe testified that he leaned into the minivan to ensure his own safety.
In November 2005, after a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree possessionof a controlled substance, the only count submitted to the jury, pursuant to Penal Law §220.18 (1). On February 8, 2006, defendant was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment andfive years of postrelease supervision.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppresssince Torres lacked probable cause when he partially entered into the vehicle while defendantlooked for paperwork. Thus, he argues, the search was illegal. Additionally, defendant claimsthat since he did not own the minivan and did not act suspiciously when being questioned byTorres, and that the drugs found by Torres were in a hidden compartment not visible to the nakedeye, the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to establish the elements of criminal possessionof a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment. In determining whetherpolice conduct was proper, the Court must look at the "totality of the circumstances" (Matterof Michael J., 270 AD2d 181 [2000], lv denied 94 NY2d 762 [2000]). In the firstinstance, the prosecution must show the legality of the police conduct in question (see Peoplev Allison, 270 AD2d 148 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 792 [2000]). However, thedefendant still "bears the ultimate burden of proving that the evidence should not be used againsthim" (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]). Also, "[i]t is fundamental that thedetermination of the hearing court should not be set aside unless clearly unsupported by therecord" (People v Spencer, 188 AD2d 408, 408 [1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 893[1993]).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "if there is a criminal suspect closeenough to the automobile so that he might get a weapon from it . . . the police maymake a search [*3]of appropriately limited scope" (Coolidgev New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 461 n 18 [1971]). Finally, we have already held that anofficer's use of a flashlight to view the area where a defendant was reaching with his hands, didnot involve an unreasonable intrusion (see People v Desir, 138 AD2d 236, 237 [1988]).
In the case at bar, defendant challenges Torres's act of leaning into the vehicle with aflashlight. Torres leaned into the vehicle due to a safety concern to ensure that defendant was notreaching for something else besides the paperwork that Torres had requested. Defendant, at thattime, had been double-parked with the engine running at a drug-prone location and the excusethat defendant gave Torres, that he was waiting for a friend, appeared to be false since the friendnever turned up during the time Torres waited with defendant. Torres's entry into the vehicle wasonly partial and, thus, limited to his upper torso, head and flashlight, which he focused ondefendant's hands. The totality of the circumstances therefore warrants a finding that Torres'slimited intrusion was justified since he was trying to ensure his own safety. Therefore, the courtproperly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
Defendant further argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove criminalpossession of the crack cocaine which had been hidden out of sight in an air bag compartment ofa vehicle he occupied but did not own. We find this argument to be without merit.
In order to sustain a charge of criminal possession of controlled substance in the seconddegree, the prosecution must establish that defendant "knowingly and unlawfully possesse[d]" atleast four ounces of a controlled substance (Penal Law § 220.18 [1]). Where the issue isone of constructive possession, the People must show that the defendant exercised knowing"dominion and control" over the property by a sufficient level of control over the area in whichthe contraband was found (People v Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992]). Constructivepossession also can be demonstrated by a defendant's "presence under a particular set ofcircumstances" from which a jury may infer possession (People v Bundy, 90 NY2d 918,920 [1997]).
In this case, we find that the verdict is based on legally sufficient evidence. Theuncontroverted evidence clearly established that defendant had actual possession of the vehicleand keys, and that he was the sole occupant and driver. First, he was sitting in the driver's seatwith the engine running, then upon exiting the vehicle he attempted to remove aparking-violation sticker on the minivan with a razor blade. As the People assert, his attempt toremove the sticker reflected his dominion and control over the vehicle. Moreover his dominionbecame especially apparent when his alleged friend failed to return to the minivan, whichcontained at least $200 on the center console and a significant amount of drugs.
We do not agree that defendant's calm demeanor precludes a finding of guilt beyond areasonable doubt. Indeed, in a case cited by defendant himself, the Fifth Circuit has held that,"[a]mong the types of behavior . . . recognized as circumstantial evidence of guiltyknowledge are . . . absence of nervousness, i.e., a cool and calm demeanor"(United States v Ortega Reyna, 148 F3d 540, 544 [1998]). Furthermore, the facts thatdefendant was not the owner of the minivan and that the crack cocaine was hidden would requirethis Court to accept the absurd conclusion that the owner of a minivan that held $3,000 worth ofcrack cocaine casually loaned the vehicle to defendant so he could drive two blocks to buymarijuana. The jury correctly rejected such an absurdity. Its verdict, moreover, is consistent withour determination in People v Caba(23 AD3d 291, 292 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 810 [2006]), where we found that thejury "reasonably concluded that a person in possession of a large and [*4]valuable quantity of drugs would not permit another person to be inclose proximity [to such drugs] unless they were both part of the same criminal enterprise andwere joint possessors." Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Nardelli and Catterson, JJ.
Moskowitz and Renwick, JJ., dissent in a memorandum by Renwick, J., as follows: A juryfound defendant guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance based upon the People'stheory that he constructively possessed 253 bags of crack cocaine that had been expertly hiddenin the air bag compartment of an automobile he occupied but did not own. The majority properlydenies suppression of the evidence as fruit of an illegal police intrusion. I disagree, however,with the majority's determination that in this wholly circumstantial evidence case, where theevidence implicates the owner of the minivan as much as the person in possession of the vehicle,the proof was sufficient to establish constructive possession of contraband. Accordingly, Irespectfully dissent.
The relevant facts are as follows: The People's evidence at trial consisted entirely of thetestimony of Police Officer Angel Torres. On July 21, 2005, Officer Torres was on patrol withhis partner, as part of the Manhattan Gang Squad. At about 3:30 p.m., Torres observed defendantsitting in the driver's seat of a double-parked minivan, with the engine running, at the corner ofWest 152nd Street and Broadway. Officer Torres's initial concern arose from the fact thatdefendant's vehicle was double-parked even though parking was available at the nextintersection. Defendant exited the vehicle to remove a Sanitation Department sticker from itswindow, and when Officer Torres asked defendant why he was double-parked, defendant repliedthat he was waiting for a friend who just went into a store across the street.
Officer Torres found defendant to be acting in a normal manner. After conversing withdefendant for a few minutes and noticing that defendant's friend failed to appear, Officer Torresasked defendant to produce the paperwork for the minivan. Defendant readily complied. Whendefendant went into the minivan to retrieve the requested documents, Officer Torres leaned inbehind with a flashlight. The officer observed an empty bag, which he later determinedcontained remnants of marihuana, and two $100 bills. Officer Torres then found nine crack drugpipes and two prescription bottles in the glove compartment. Upon further investigation, OfficerTorres also recovered 253 bags of crack cocaine from a secret air bag compartment. Accordingto Officer Torres, the drug concealment had been expertly done so that it would not have beenvisible to the average person.
The name on the van's registration, Brian Anderson, was confirmed by a computer search. Itwas further confirmed that the vehicle was not stolen. However, rather than investigate thisevidence, Officer Torres summarily concluded that the owner was not relevant to his case, andhe never investigated, contacted or tried to locate Anderson in any way. Likewise, Officer Torresnever attempted to locate the people named on the prescription bottles. The officer did not findanything in the car with defendant's name or other property belonging to him.[*5]
Fifteen minutes transpired from the time Torres firststopped defendant until his arrest, but the arresting officers never looked for defendant's friend inthe bodega. Again, the officers concluded that the crack pipes belonged to defendant. OfficerTorres interviewed defendant after his arrest, at which time defendant stated that he hadborrowed the car to buy weed and had nothing further to tell the officer. Officer Torres failed towrite this statement down and never asked defendant for details about his planned purchase.
Defendant presented no evidence at the trial. Instead, at the close of the People's case, hiscounsel moved to dismiss on sufficiency grounds, which Supreme Court denied. Defendantcorrectly contends that, based on the meager evidence presented against him, at the close of thePeople's case, no basis was established upon which the jury could find that he had constructivepossession of the contraband.
To meet their burden under the theory of constructive possession, the People must presentevidence that "the defendant exercised 'dominion or control' over the property" (People vManini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992], quoting Penal Law § 10.00 [8]). Constructivepossession requires that the defendant know of the location of the drugs and be able to exercisedominion and control over them, together with the intent to exercise such dominion and control(People v Edwards, 206 AD2d 597, 597 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 907 [1994]),and not merely that the defendant had access to the contraband (People v DeJesus, 44 AD3d 464[2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 763 [2008]). Thus, constructive possession requiresknowledge coupled with the ability to exercise dominion and control over the area in which thecontraband is found (id.).
Here, it is incontrovertible that the contraband was found expertly hidden in the air bagcompartment of the minivan of which defendant had possession but no ownership. Additionally,there is no evidence that there was any bulge or discoloration or smell that may raise one'ssuspicion that the area was anything other than an ordinary air bag compartment. Defendant'sability to exercise control over the vehicle and his brief presence in the vehicle are insufficient,at least under the circumstances of this case, to establish constructive possession of the hiddencontraband.
Initially it should be pointed out that the People did not, and could not, rely solely ondefendant's presence in the vehicle to support the theory of constructive possession. The law isabundantly clear that evidence of a defendant's mere presence in the location where drugs arefound is not sufficient evidence of constructive possession (People v Headley, 74 NY2d858, 859 [1989] ["The People presented no evidence of defendant's dominion and control overthe contraband. Proof that the premises were used for drug dealing was not sufficient to establishthat defendant himself was guilty of unlawful drug and weapons possession"]; see alsoPeople v Brown, 240 AD2d 675 [1997] [defendant, girlfriend of apartment's lessee, merelypresent when contraband discovered during execution of search warrant in apartment];People v Gil, 220 AD2d 328, 328 [1995] ["Nothing other than defendant having beeninside the apartment connects defendant to the apartment or the drugs"]).
Moreover, where the contraband is found in a place to which the accused and others haveaccess and over which none had exclusive control, courts have shown reluctance to inferconstructive possession of contraband by one occupant where there is evidence in the recordexplicitly linking contraband to another individual (see e.g. People v Huertas, 32 AD3d 795 [2006] [defendant'sconviction was reversed because there was legally insufficient evidence to establish thatdefendant exercised dominion and control over contraband found in the garage; given thatdefendant was standing inside a garage entryway when police entered the garage, [*6]People failed to connect defendant to marihuana operation, whichwas located in two rooms of the garage]). Instead, in such a scenario, there must be additionalindependent conduct by the defendant indicating intent to exercise dominion and control over thecontraband (see e.g. People vLeader, 27 AD3d 901 [2006]).
For example, in People v Burns(17 AD3d 709 [2005]), the Court found that the evidence was insufficient to establishdefendant's constructive possession of bags of drugs found in the trunk of the vehicle in which hewas a passenger, which was required to support conviction of criminal possession of marihuana.There, the driver testified that he left the key in the car, as instructed, upon arrival at the casinoand that he did not know what occurred in the parking lot while he was inside the casino.Instead, he noticed that both defendant and the back seat passenger were absent from the casinofor about an hour and saw them return together, but he never saw bags before he left the casinoand could not state who had placed them in the trunk. Defendant was not the owner or operatorof the vehicle, and the only car key was in the driver's possession. The Court found suchevidence insufficient to establish that the defendant participated in conduct establishing intent toexercise dominion and control over the contraband (id. at 710-711).
In this case, nothing in the evidence ties the contraband hidden in the air bag compartment todefendant as opposed to the owner of the minivan. There is absolutely no evidence with regardto the period of defendant's possession of the minivan prior to the police encounter. Essentially,all the People presented in this case was the contraband that the police discovered in the hiddenair bag compartment of the minivan, in which defendant was present for a brief period of timeand to which defendant had access but did not own. To permit a defendant to be convicted onsuch meager evidence comes perilously close to endorsing guilt by presence at the scene of thecontraband, a concept courts have persistently disavowed (see e.g. People v Headley, 74NY2d at 859; People v Brown, 240 AD2d at 675-676; People v Gil, 220 AD2dat 328-329).
Contrary to the prosecutor's contention, the circumstances of defendant's arrest warranted nomore than speculation that he may have been involved in the drug trade. Indeed, at no time priorto the arrest did the arresting officer observe defendant engage in any type of activity indicatingthat he was engaged in the drug trade. The only items the police found in the vehicle were two$100 bills and nine crack pipes. Neither of these items constitutes paraphernalia customarilyidentified with the drug trade, as compared to drug use, such as large amounts of money oragents used for cutting cocaine (see e.g. People v Bond, 239 AD2d 785 [1997], lvdenied 90 NY2d 891 [1997] [testimony that razor, digital scales and plastic bags were usedto cut, weigh and bag the cocaine for distribution, none of which would have been necessary ifthe cocaine was for personal use]).
The prosecutor and the majority herein, however, characterize as "absurd" that the owner ofthe minivan would place such a large quantity of contraband in a vehicle and then casually lendit to defendant with that precious cargo inside. Such characterization would have beencompelling if the drugs had been placed in an area readily discoverable by an unsuspectingpassenger or driver. The argument, however, loses its persuasiveness where, as here, the drugswere placed in a hidden compartment and, as Officer Torres testified, had been so expertlyconcealed as to be undetectable by the average layperson. Rather, in the absence of any evidencewith regard to the period of defendant's possession of the minivan vis-à-vis the owner'spossession prior to the [*7]police discovery of the contraband,the expertly hidden compartment implicates the owner of the minivan as much as the person inpossession of the vehicle. To convict here there must be evidence to preclude the possibility thatthe contraband was put in the hidden compartment by the owner of the car without defendant'sknowledge. The People's evidence does nothing to exclude this possibility.
Indeed, while it appears that no New York State appellate case has examined a convictionfor constructive possession of contraband under a factual scenario similar to this case, cases fromother courts provide persuasive authority for the conclusion that the evidence adduced at trialwas insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. For instance, in Commonwealth vMovilis (46 Mass App Ct 574, 707 NE2d 845 [1999]), a Massachusetts appeals courtdetermined that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the defendant was in possession of alarge amount of cocaine found in the vehicle he had been driving, which he had parked outside acafÉ. The defendant and his passenger exited from the vehicle and entered theestablishment. The police followed him inside, where they observed, in plain view, a smallquantity of cocaine on a table in front of the defendant. The police escorted him outside,obtained his car keys, searched the vehicle, and found a large quantity of cocaine hidden insidean electronically controlled, secret compartment built into the rear portion of the front passengerseat. The court found significant that the prosecution, like the People in this case, offered noevidence of the connection between the defendant and the registered owner of the vehicle, nordid it establish any link between the cocaine in the automobile and the traces of cocaine found inthe cafÉ. On these facts, the appeals court concluded, the Commonwealth had notestablished that the defendant had knowledge of either the existence or contents of the secretcompartment, and therefore possession had not been proved.
Similarly, the United States Fifth Circuit, in a factual scenario analogous to this case, heldin United States v Ortega Reyna (148 F3d 540 [1998]) that the circumstantial evidencedid not, as a matter of law, support a finding that the defendant knowingly possessed illegaldrugs found in a hidden compartment of a borrowed truck's tire. There, the Fifth Circuitpreliminarily noted that the agents' observations of alleged nervousness or lack of composure ofa person they are detaining "provides equal circumstantial support for a finding of either guilt orinnocence." (Id. at 545.) The Fifth Circuit went on to hold the evidence insufficient toestablish knowledge of the concealed marihuana where the vehicle had been borrowed by thedefendant, the defendant hesitated briefly before answering questions about the marihuana, thetire containing the marihuana was noticeably larger than the other three, the defendant was inpossession of over $700 in cash, and the defendant and his wife gave essentially consistentaccounts of their travel destination and purpose (id. at 546-547).
In a case that rests solely upon circumstantial evidence of constructive possession (seePeople v Torres, 68 NY2d 677 [1986]), the test of legal sufficiency is a stringent one. Itrequires the court, while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People andgiving them the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom (see CPL290.10 [1] [a]; 70.10 [1]; People v Way, 59 NY2d 361, 365 [1983]; People vMarin, 102 AD2d 14, 27-28 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 741 [1985]), to determinewhether the facts from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn are inconsistent withinnocence and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence (see People v Giuliano,65 NY2d 766 [1985]; People v Marin, 102 AD2d at 27).
In sum, like in Movilis and Ortega Reyna, no matter how suspicious the factsmight [*8]appear to be in this case, the People failed to presentsubstantial, competent evidence inconsistent with the reasonable hypothesis that the owner of thevan placed the cocaine in the hidden compartment of the car without defendant's knowledge.Rather, the meager evidence presented here makes it more likely that the drugs belonged to theowner than the driver. It was therefore entirely consistent with defendant's statement that heborrowed the van without knowledge that it contained hidden cocaine, and it warranted no morethan speculation that defendant exercised dominion and control over the drugs hidden in a secretcompartment of another person's vehicle. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction should bereversed and the indictment dismissed.