| People v Tafari |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 09997 [68 AD3d 1540] |
| December 31, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Injah Tafari,Appellant. |
—[*1] Anna E. Remet, Special Prosecutor, Kingston, for respondent.
Malone Jr., J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), renderedApril 7, 2008 in Ulster County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of assault inthe second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree and criminal mischief in the thirddegree, and (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered December 29, 2008 in UlsterCounty, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment ofconviction, without a hearing.
In December 2005, while incarcerated at Eastern Correctional Facility in Ulster County,defendant engaged in a physical altercation involving several correction officers during which hethrew chairs through glass windows and caused injuries to two correction officers. As a result, hewas charged by indictment with four counts of assault in the second degree and one count ofcriminal mischief in the third degree.
Following the ensuing jury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal mischief in the thirddegree, assault in the third degree and two counts of assault in the second degree. Prior tosentencing, defendant unsuccessfully moved pro se to vacate the judgment of convictionpursuant to CPL article 330 and was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate prison term ofseven years with five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appealed from the judgment ofconviction [*2]and thereafter moved pro se to vacate thejudgment pursuant to CPL article 440. That motion was denied by Supreme Court, without ahearing, and this Court granted defendant permission to appeal from that order.
Defendant initially contends that the two assault in the second degree convictions were notsupported by legally sufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence.Specifically, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented of his intent tocause physical injury (see Penal Law § 120.05 [2], [7]). However, viewing theevidence presented in the light most favorable to the People, as we must, we find that a rationalperson could conclude that defendant intended to injure those correction officers (see Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Further, while a different result would not have beenunreasonable, after evaluating the evidence in a neutral light, and according appropriatedeference to the jury's credibility determinations, we likewise find that the verdict was notagainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).
However, we agree with defendant that the judgment of conviction should nevertheless bereversed and a new trial granted because Supreme Court improperly denied him hisconstitutional right to self-representation. The court denied defendant's request to representhimself at trial, apparently based upon defendant's mental illness and the perception thatmedication for his condition affected defendant's ability to understand the proceedings. Adefendant in a criminal case may invoke the right to self-representation as long as the request isunequivocal and timely asserted, the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent afair and orderly trial, and he or she knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel(see People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10, 17 [1974]). Here, defendant's request, made beforethe trial commenced, was timely and unequivocal (see id.). Upon a review of the record,it cannot be said that defendant's behavior was aimed at purposefully delaying the proceedings orpreventing an orderly trial but, rather, the record reflects that he engaged in efforts to defendhimself for legitimate reasons (see People v Schoolfield, 196 AD2d 111, 117 [1994],lv dismissed 83 NY2d 858 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 915 [1994]).
Defendant likewise met the final prong of McIntyre by knowingly and intelligentlywaiving his right to counsel. Supreme Court's statements during the colloquy seem to implicatedefendant's competency to stand trial. Yet the court found defendant competent after orderingexaminations pursuant to CPL article 730. That finding, along with defendant's responses to thecourt's discussion regarding the risks of proceeding without counsel, sufficiently established thatdefendant was capable of waiving his right to counsel and could proceed unrepresented (seePeople v Reason, 37 NY2d 351, 356 [1975]). By refusing to allow defendant to proceed prose, partially under the paternalistic view that defendant would obtain a better defense withknowledgeable counsel, the court violated defendant's constitutional right to self-representation.Having been denied that right, he is entitled to a new trial (cf. People v Reason, 37 NY2dat 356; People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d at 18-19). In light of this determination, we do notaddress defendant's remaining claims.
Peters, J.P., Spain, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and order arereversed, on the law, motion to vacate granted, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for anew trial.