| Matter of Amsterdam Nursing Home Corp. (1992) v Daines |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 10017 [68 AD3d 1591] |
| December 31, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Amsterdam Nursing Home Corporation (1992) etal., Appellants, v Richard F. Daines, as Commissioner of Health, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of counsel), forrespondents.
Cardona, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), enteredOctober 15, 2008 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78,granted respondents' motion to dismiss the amended petition.
As is relevant to this appeal, petitioners are licensed residential health care facilities that arereimbursed with public funds at rates determined by the Department of Health (hereinafter DOH)for health care services provided to eligible residents. Following the implementation in 2006 ofthe Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit Program, DOH notified petitioners that theadjusted Medicaid reimbursement rates would include an offset for the subsidy that the nursinghome facilities would receive from the federal government for prescription drugs for Medicaideligible residents.
Thereafter, petitioners filed administrative rate appeals with DOH challenging the offsetamounts. After DOH rejected petitioners' challenges as not the proper subject of the [*2]administrative rate appeals process, petitioners commenced thisCPLR article 78 proceeding in October 2007 challenging their adjusted Medicaid reimbursementrates for the period of January 1, 2006 through August 31, 2007, as well as DOH's rejection oftheir administrative rate appeals. Supreme Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss thepetition—as amended—as time-barred in accordance with CPLR article 78proceedings. This appeal ensued.
We are unpersuaded by petitioners' contention that Supreme Court erred in dismissing theamended petition as untimely. A review of the amended petition establishes that petitioners werechallenging the methodology used by DOH in determining the Medicaid reimbursement rates forprescription drugs, claiming that a "one size fits all" approach to the offset does not accuratelymeasure the amount of reimbursement for prescriptions. Such challenge relates to themethod used in calculating the rate, and not to any computational errors or errorsin the submission of fiscal or statistical data. The latter would warrant a review pursuant to theadministrative rate appeals process, while a challenge to the methodology is properly consideredby way of CPLR article 78 review (see Matter of St. Ann's Home for the Aged v Daines,67 AD3d 1326 [2009]; Matter of Pinegrove Manor II, LLC v Daines, 60 AD3d 767, 768[2009]). Inasmuch as petitioners did not commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding within theapplicable four-month statute of limitations period (see CPLR 217), Supreme Courtproperly dismissed the petition as time-barred.
Furthermore, we are unpersuaded by petitioners' alternate contention that respondents areequitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Specifically, petitioners arguethat it would be manifestly unjust to leave them without any remedy to challenge the MedicarePart D offset because they relied, to their detriment, on erroneous advice from an apparenthigh-ranking, rate-setting DOH official who stated that petitioners should file administrative rateappeals in order to protect their interests and it was more than a year before DOH rejected theirchallenge as an improper subject for the administrative rate appeals process. However, thedoctrine of equitable estoppel generally is unavailable against a government agency in theexercise of its governmental function (see Notaro v Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 41AD3d 1318, 1319 [2007], lv dismissed 9 NY3d 935 [2007]; Matter of Grella vHevesi, 38 AD3d 113, 117 [2007]). Moreover, " 'erroneous advice by a governmentemployee does not constitute the type of unusual circumstance[s] contemplated by the exception'" to this general rule (Notaro v Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 41 AD3d at 1320, quotingMatter of Grella v Hevesi, 38 AD3d at 117). Here, the conduct alleged by petitionersdoes not excuse the untimely commencement of a CPLR article 78 proceeding nor does itconstitute the type of circumstances warranting application of the estoppel doctrine against thestate (see Matter of New York State Med. Transporters Assn. v Perales, 77 NY2d 126,130-131 [1990]; Notaro v Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 41 AD3d at 1319-1320).
Mercure, Spain, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.