| Matter of Jaquin v Community Covenant Church |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00033 [69 AD3d 998] |
| January 7, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Brenda Jaquin, Appellant, vCommunity Covenant Church et al., Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
—[*1] Wolff, Goodrich & Goldman, L.L.P., Syracuse (Robert E. Geyer Jr. of counsel), forCommunity Covenant Church and another, respondents.
Garry, J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed January 24,2008, which ruled that claimant did not sustain a causally related injury and denied her claim forworkers' compensation benefits.
Claimant alleges that she suffered a work-related injury to her neck, back, and left arm whenshe lifted a heavy child out of a carriage during the course of her employment at a day-carecenter in February 2004. In March 2004, claimant completed a C-3 form and, in June 2004, theclaim was closed for lack of prima facie medical evidence. A panel of the Workers'Compensation Board affirmed the decision on the ground that claimant had not shown a causalrelationship between her symptoms and her work activities, but reopened the case for submissionof additional medical evidence. In January 2005, claimant submitted a second C-3 form thatprovided somewhat different statements of the date, nature, and circumstances of the injury andof the timing and nature of the notice allegedly given to the employer. Following a June 2005hearing, the case was marked for no action and claimant was allowed to obtain clarifyingmedical evidence. In May 2007, the case was given expedited status, prima facie evidence of aneck injury was established, and a further hearing was scheduled, at which claimant and a [*2]representative of her employer testified. The claim wassubsequently disallowed upon determinations that claimant had failed to show a causalrelationship between the injury and her employment by competent medical evidence, and that theopinion of claimant's doctor as to a causal relationship, given two years after the accident, lackedfoundation in the record. The Board affirmed the decision and claimant now appeals.
The burden is upon claimant to produce competent medical evidence establishing that herinjuries or limitations are causally related to her employment (see Matter of Norton v North SyracuseCent. School Dist., 59 AD3d 890, 890 [2009]; Matter of Mayette v Village of Massena Fire Dept., 49 AD3d 920,922 [2008]). The medical records reveal that she had a history of chronic neck and lower backpain predating her alleged injury in February 2004, as well as a separate work-related back andneck injury in the summer of 2003. The treatment notes indicate that, when she sought medicaltreatment on the day after the February 2004 injury, claimant was not treated for back or neckpain but for complaints of chest discomfort, shortness of breath, and pain and numbness in herleft arm. The notes indicate that she reported feeling back pain after lifting a child on theprevious day, but also state that no such pain was present at the time of treatment. Several dayslater, claimant was treated for tingling in the left upper extremity that she reportedly believedwas caused by the use of a treadmill. Notes for that date specifically indicate that claimant hadno neck pain and no history of a neck injury. A week later, she was treated for chronic neck painand, several weeks thereafter, for chronic neck and back pain and left carpal tunnel syndrome. InMarch 2004, she was treated for left arm pain and cervical spine pain described as "insidious inonset." The notes report that she was removed from work in March 2004 for severe footpain,[FN*]but notes from the next month state that the reason for her removal was carpal tunnel syndrome.A note in June 2004 indicates that claimant was having difficulty establishing a workers'compensation claim because she could not clearly establish when her symptoms developed.
In addition to these and other inconsistencies in the medical records, there werediscrepancies in claimant's own accounts of the event and its consequences. For example, heroriginal C-3 form stated that she gave oral notice of the accident to her employer'srepresentatives in March 2004, while the second C-3 form stated that she gave them oral andwritten notice in February 2004. Claimant's employer, however, asserted that the first notice itreceived of the incident was a copy of claimant's first C-3 form. The credibility issues presentedby these and other discrepancies in the evidence were for the Board to resolve (see Matter of Wilson v Southern TierCustom Fabricators, 51 AD3d 1228, 1229 [2008]; Matter of Thomasula v Wilson Concrete & Masonry, 15 AD3d796, 796 [2005]).
Though the Board may not fashion its own expert medical opinions, it may reject medicalevidence as incredible or insufficient even where, as here, no opposing medical proof ispresented (see Matter of Rios vGoodwill Indus., 60 AD3d 1243, 1244 [2009]; Matter of Musa v Nassau CountyPolice Dept., 276 AD2d 851, 852 [2000]). Claimant's proof failed to definitively link herinjuries to the February 2004 event rather than to the 2003 accident or to her preexistingconditions. As the Board's determination is supported by substantial evidence, it will not bedisturbed (see Matter of Young vPentax Precision Instrument Corp., 57 AD3d 1323, 1324 [2008]; Matter ofThomasula v Wilson Concrete & Masonry, 15 AD3d at 796-797).[*3]
Mercure, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur.Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: These symptoms are not allegedto be work related.