| Matter of Steenrod v City of Oneonta |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00052 [69 AD3d 1030] |
| January 7, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Robert Steenrod, Appellant, v City ofOneonta et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Kehoe & Merzig, P.C., Oneonta (David S. Merzig of counsel), for respondents.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Coccoma, J.), entered March 16,2009 in Otsego County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent City of Oneonta Common Councildenying petitioner's application for a special use permit.
Petitioner is the owner of a three-apartment, 10-bedroom house in the City of Oneonta,Otsego County that he rents to college students on an annual basis. When he applied for a specialuse permit to allow him to also rent the property to summer transients on a weekly basis,respondent City of Oneonta Common Council (hereinafter respondent) denied his application.Petitioner then commenced this proceeding to annul respondent's determination, and SupremeCourt properly dismissed his petition.
When a municipality's determination of an application for a special use permit has a rationalbasis and is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the courts will defer to it (see Matter of Ohrenstein v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Town of Canaan, 39 AD3d 1041, 1042 [2007]; Matter of Fischlin vBoard of Appeals of Town of Philipstown, 176 AD2d 50, 53 [1992]; Matter of Samek vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Ballston, 162 AD2d 926, 927 [1990]). If there arespecific, reasonable grounds for the municipality to conclude that the proposed special use is notdesirable at the particular location, then the permit may properly be denied even though thestatutory requirements for the special use are met (see Matter of Beck v Gravelding, 247[*2]AD2d 831, 832 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 801[1998]; Matter of Samek v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Ballston, 162 AD2d at928; Matter of Market Sq. Props. v Town of Guilderland Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 109AD2d 164, 166 [1985], affd 66 NY2d 893 [1985]).
Here, there is no dispute that the transient weekly rental use proposed for petitioner'spremises is a special use described in the zoning ordinance of respondent City of Oneontasubject to review and approval by respondent. The relevant ordinance provides a list of criteriaupon which a special use permit may be denied, including factors—such as inadequateon-street parking—that would cause a "detrimental impact on the neighborhood where thepermit is to be issued" (City of Oneonta Municipal Code § 300-46 [V] [5] [d]).Respondent's written determination recounts that petitioner's application was denied because of,among other things, street congestion and insufficient on-street parking.
As to these factors, the record shows that one of respondent's members cited the congestionon the block caused by the expansion of a nearby restaurant, the fire department's regular use ofthe street as a shortcut and the fact that several other properties were already engaged in summertransient rentals. As for parking, while it is true that petitioner stated in his application that hisproperty has one off-street parking space for each rental unit, the sample weekly-rentalagreement that he attached to his application states that any tenant wishing an on-site parkingspace must pay a fee and sign a separate parking agreement. Thus, respondent could reasonablyconclude that tenants would choose to park on the street to avoid extra expense. In addition,respondent had questions about the number of transient tenants and, implicitly, the number ofvehicles that would be using the premises that were not addressed in petitioner's application andwent unanswered due to his failure to appear at the hearing. Moreover, one of the neighbors whodid appear raised public safety concerns regarding the difficulty that emergency vehicles wouldhave in traversing the street. As a result, we agree with Supreme Court that there is substantialevidence in the record supporting respondent's determination that the proposed special use wasundesirable due to current conditions in the neighborhood (see e.g Matter of Samek v ZoningBd. of Appeals of Town of Ballston, 162 AD2d at 928; Matter of Market Sq. Props. vTown of Guilderland Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 109 AD2d at 166).
Petitioner's remaining contention that Supreme Court substituted its judgment for that ofrespondent by mentioning factors not cited in respondent's written decision is without merit.Supreme Court examined the record and merely enumerated additional facts, such as the fee foron-site parking, that were in the record before respondent and provided further support for itsdetermination (see Matter of Ohrenstein v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Canaan, 39AD3d at 1043; Matter of Samek v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Ballston, 162AD2d at 928; compare Matter of MetroEnviro Transfer, LLC v Village of Croton-on-Hudson, 7 AD3d 625, 627 [2004],affd 5 NY3d 236 [2005]).
Spain, J.P., Malone Jr., McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.