| Plourd v Sidoti |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00056 [69 AD3d 1038] |
| January 7, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Caitlin Plourd, Respondent, v Louis Anthony Sidoti et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Hodgson Russ, L.L.P., Albany (Noreen DeWire Grimmick of counsel), for Seton HealthSystem, Inc., appellant. Robinson Donovan, P.C., Springfield, Massachusetts (Frederica H. McCarthy of counsel),for respondent.
Mercure, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Lynch, J.), entered June 30, 2009in Rensselaer County, which denied defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint.
After falling down a flight of stairs, plaintiff sought treatment at the emergency room of St.Mary's Hospital in the City of Troy, Rensselaer County, which is operated by defendant SetonHealth System, Inc. Following a physical examination and review of X rays of her wrists,plaintiff was diagnosed as having suffered, among other things, a sprained right wrist. The wristwas splinted and plaintiff was given copies of the X rays and advised to consult with her ownphysician, which she did. When plaintiff's wrist pain failed to abate for several months, sheobtained further treatment and was found to have suffered a navicular fracture in her right wristthat had not healed and required surgery to correct.
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action, alleging that the failure of the emergency room[*2]physician, defendant Louis Sidoti, to diagnose the fracturecaused her unnecessary pain and led to the need for surgery. Following joinder of issue, SupremeCourt denied defendants' separate motions for summary judgment. Defendants now appeal andwe affirm.
To the extent the issue is disputed, we agree with Supreme Court that defendants met theirinitial burden of demonstrating a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter oflaw. The burden accordingly shifted to plaintiff to show, by competent medical proof, that adeviation from the accepted standard of care occurred and that a causal nexus existed betweenthat deviation and her injuries (seeDaugharty v Marshall, 60 AD3d 1219, 1221 [2009]; Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2008]; Snyder v Simon, 49 AD3d 954,956 [2008]). To that end, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of G. Richard Braen, a physicianlicensed to practice in New York who is board certified in internal medicine and currentlyemployed in the field of emergency medicine.
Initially, given that the alleged malpractice occurred in the context of emergency medicine,Braen's board certification and his employment support an inference that his expert opinion wasa reliable one, "and any alleged lack of skill or experience goes to the weight to be given to theopinion, not its admissibility" (Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d at 1242; see Borawski v Huang, 34 AD3d409, 410 [2006]). The record reveals that the X ray of plaintiff's right wrist taken at theemergency room indicated a possible fracture, but that a physician's assistant who examinedplaintiff noted that the X ray was negative, a finding Sidoti signed off on. Braen opined thatSidoti deviated from accepted practice by, among other things, failing to advise plaintiff of thepossible fracture and refer her to an orthopedist. As to the issue of proximate cause, Braenopined in succinct fashion that the failure to properly treat the fracture likely led to the surgeryrequired to correct the problem. This opinion was sufficient to raise a question of fact givenBraen's discussion of the pertinent facts and identification of the appropriate treatment for anavicular fracture—immobilization by casting—which defendants' alleged errorsprevented plaintiff from obtaining (see Bell v Ellis Hosp., 50 AD3d at 1242;Anderson v Lamaute, 306 AD2d 232, 233-234 [2003]).
Defendants' remaining arguments have been examined and found to be wanting in merit.
Peters, Lahtinen and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.