| People v Williams |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00188 [69 AD3d 662] |
| January 5, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Adrian Williams, Appellant. |
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Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ayres, J.),rendered September 10, 2008, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and grand larcenyin the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On April 25, 2007, the defendant entered a bank, jumped over the tellers' counter, andgrabbed bills from the cash drawers. When the defendant attempted to flee, he was apprehendedby the bank's manager, who, after a scuffle, was able to subdue the defendant with the aid ofseveral other bank employees and customers. During the scuffle, the defendant elbowed themanager in the eye, bit the manager's arm, and scratched the manager's back. Viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt ofrobbery in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law § 160.10[2] [a]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish thatthe defendant caused "substantial pain" and, therefore, "[p]hysical injury" (Penal Law §10.00 [9]), to the bank's manager (seePeople v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447-448 [2007]; People v Gordon, 47 AD3d 833, 834 [2008]). The managertestified that he sought medical treatment for his injuries, ranked his pain level at a "6" or "7" outof "10," and was given pain medication. Moreover, the jury could reasonably infer that thedefendant intended to inflict as much pain as possible in order to escape the manager's hold(see People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d at 448).
Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's contention, the evidence was legally sufficient toestablish that he "use[d] . . . physical force upon another person for the purpose of. . . [p]reventing or overcoming resistance to the . . . retention [of thestolen property] immediately after the taking" (Penal Law § 160.00 [1]). The evidencesupported a finding that the defendant was in possession of the stolen cash at the time he struckthe bank's manager. Under these circumstances, the jury was entitled to infer that the defendant'spurpose in exerting such physical force was to retain control of the stolen cash, and not merely[*2]to escape or defend himself (see People v Nieves, 37 AD3d277 [2007]; People v Onorati,15 AD3d 216, 217 [2005]; People v Brandley, 254 AD2d 185 [1998]; People vCrespo, 158 AD2d 466 [1990]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Fisher, J.P., Covello, Santucci andBalkin, JJ., concur.